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ALL THINGS CONSIDERED: THE CONTRIBUTION
OF THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE LICENSING
SYSTEM TO THE BATTLE AGAINST PREDATORY
LENDING
Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Record levels of home foreclosures1 and personal bankruptcies
2
and apprehension about their impact on Wall Street3 have intensified
efforts to combat the abusive loan terms and practices that comprise
predatory lending.4 One consequence of this intensification may be a
* B.A. Wabash College, 1977; M.A. Duke University, 1978; J.D. Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington, 1982; Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. I would
like to acknowledge the valuable assistance provided by Dragomir Cosanici, Head Research Librarian,
Ruth Lilly Law Library, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, and by my research assistant,
Ann E. Christoff.
1. Foreclosure statistics are available from RealtyTrac, and loan delinquency statistics are available
from the Mortgage Bankers Association. RealtyTrac's 2007 U.S. Foreclosure Market statistics are
available at http://www.realtytrac.com. On October 11, 2007, RealtyTrac announced that in September
of 2007 there were 223,538 foreclosure filings in the U.S., a figure that is "up 99% from the number
reported in September 2006." This statistic is somewhat camouflaged by the title of the news release,
which is "Foreclosure Activity Decreases 8 Percent in September," http://www.realtytrac.com (follow
"News & Events" hyperlink under "Company Information;" then follow October 11, 2007 "Foreclosure
Activity Decreases 8 Percent in September" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). The 8% decrease
refers to foreclosure activity in September 2007 compared to August 2007. Id. Lest the decrease sound
like good news, RealtyTrac reports that foreclosures in August of 2007 were the highest in thirty-two
months. Id. A summary of the Mortgage Bankers Association's National Delinquency Survey for the
fourth quarter of 2006 is available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org (follow "News and Media"
hyperlink; follow "more" hyperlink under "MBA News;" then follow "National Delinquency Survey"
hyperlink) (including instructions for purchasing a copy of the full survey) (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
2. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts compiles bankruptcy statistics, which are available
at http://www.uscourts.gov (follow "Library" hyperlink; follow "Statistical Reports" hyperlink; then
follow "Bankruptcy Statistics" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
3. Reports of the impact of subprime mortgage loan defaults on the stock market are a daily
occurrence as this Article goes to print. The topic dominates both electronic and print media.
4. Given the ingenuity of lenders and brokers who would prey on consumers, it is as difficult to
formulate a fully encompassing definition of "predatory lending" as it is to formulate a fully
encompassing definition of predatory lending's siblings, fraud and unconscionability. In that sense, we
must avoid insisting on too precise a definition that would give the appearance that only specified
practices are objectionable and all others are validated. Even so, some definition is needed for a term
that is so central to this Article. To that end, I adopt as a working definition of predatory lending the
"syndrome of loan abuses" proposed by Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy in their article,
Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2038, 2039,
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willingness by policymakers to view the problem of predatory
lending from a systematic perspective-that is, to identify the unique
ways that each actor in the subprime lending pipeline contributes to
the problem and to craft responses appropriate to each.5 Of all the
actors in this pipeline, the mortgage lender and the mortgage broker
are the two most visible to consumers, although others-especially
the secondary market securitizers and investors on whom non-
depository lenders and brokers depend for capital-are also important
participants. Perhaps the most significant regulatory program
currently being developed to combat abusive practices by state-
chartered lenders6 and by mortgage brokers is the National Mortgage
Licensing System, which is the product of the joint leadership of the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) 7 and the American
Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR).8
2043-45 (2007). Professors Engel and McCoy identify seven commonly occurring types of abusive
behavior that are included in the syndrome. Id. They are: (1) "Loans structured to result in seriously
disproportionate net harm to borrowers," (2) "Rent seeking," (3) "Loans involving illegal fraud or
deception," (4) "Other forms of non-transparency that do not amount to fraud," (5) "Loans requiring
borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress," (6) "Lending discrimination," and (7) "Servicing abuses."
Id. Other definitions and examples of predatory lending abound. For a definition that focuses on non-
competitive pricing and excessive risk, as opposed to fraud-like behavior and illustrative practices, see
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending:
Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 735-41 (2006). Also, see generally, testimony given at Subprime and
Predatory Mortgage Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions and Effects on
Regulated Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Subprime and
Predatory Lending Hearing].
5. For a discussion of the importance of broadening anti-predatory lending initiatives from a
programmatic approach that focuses on prohibiting specific loan terms and practices to a systematic
approach that also includes initiatives directed at establishing duties from mortgage brokers to
consumers, eliminating appraisal fraud by real estate appraisers, eliminating the holder in due course
defense for secondary market participants, increasing consumer financial literacy through education, and
decreasing broker and lender influence over consumers through counseling, see Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr.,
Effecting Responsibility in the Mortgage Broker-Borrower Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles
in Predatory Lending Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1471 (2005).
6. Federally-chartered lenders are supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift Supervision, or the National
Credit Union Association. State regulators have been preempted from regulating lenders subject to
federal supervision. See OCC Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003).
States can regulate state-chartered banks, state-chartered non-depository lenders, and mortgage brokers.
Id.
7. The CSBS:
is the nationwide organization for state banking, representing the bank regulators of the
50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and
[Vol. 24:415
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THE NMLS AND PREDATORY LENDING
Through multi-state uniform license application and renewal forms
and a national database of licensed mortgage lenders and brokers
(collectively referred to as "licensees"), CSBS and AARMR seek to
create a state-level regulatory framework that holds in creative
tension the interests of three constituencies-state regulators,
residential mortgage industry participants, and consumers. This task
is complicated by two factors. One is the often conflicting interests of
the constituents. The other is the constraints imposed by vertical
federalism, on the one hand, as manifested by the preemption power
asserted by federal regulatory agencies, 9  and by horizontal
approximately 6,200 state-chartered financial institutions. The Conference is responsible
for defending state authority to determine banking structure and the products and services
state-chartered institutions can offer and for improving the quality of state bank
supervision ....
Press Release, CSBS, CSBS Forms LLC to House National Mortgage Licensing System (Oct. 4, 2006),
http://www.csbs.org (follow "Public Relations" hyperlink; then follow "Press Releases Archives"
hyperlink) [hereinafter October 4, 2006, Press Release]. CSBS has a Regulatory Affairs section, which
is identified as "a forceful advocate for the state banking system, providing the state perspective on
federal regulatory policy proposals that directly affect state chartered banks and state bank supervisors."
http://www.csbs.org (follow "Regulatory Affairs" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). Further
information about the organization, mission, and initiatives of CSBS can be found at its website,
http://www.csbs.org.
8. The AARMR "is the national organization representing state residential mortgage regulators.
AARMR's mission is to promote the exchange of information between and among the executives and
employees of the various states who are charged with the responsibility for the administration and
regulation of residential mortgage lending, servicing, and brokering." October 4, 2006, Press Release,
supra note 7. Further information about the organization, mission, and initiatives of AARMR can be
found at its website: http://www.aannr.org.
9. See OCC Preemption Determination and Order, supra note 6; OTS Preemption Order, 12 C.F.R.
§ 590.1 (2008); NCUA Preemption Order, 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(b) (2008). The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the OCC's extension of its preemption authority to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of
nationally-chartered financial institutions in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1562
(2007). Another case decided subsequent to Watters that exhibits the federal agencies' aggressive
invocation of the preemption doctrine is Charter One Mortgage Corp. v. Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602 (Ind.
2007), a case heard by the Indiana Supreme Court. In that case, the OCC filed an amicus brief on behalf
of the mortgage company, arguing that federal banking laws and regulations preempted state
constitutional provisions concerning regulation of the unauthorized practice of law. Brief for the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Charter One Mortgage
Corp.v. Kyle Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. 2007) (No. 00-40439-CH). The Indiana Supreme Court held
that Charter One's employees did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law when they charged a
fee for preparing a promissory note and mortgage, but it did so on grounds other than federal
preemption. Charter One, 865 N.E.2d at 606-07. The preemption issue has attracted significant
scholarly attention, including Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory
Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting off More than They Can Chew?, 56 Am. U.
L. REv. 515 (2007).
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HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 417 2007-2008
)     417 
 t     
  
l  s"),    
   
 tate t r , 
  
t   ti  f 
  l 
  r 
  
i tely   i  l  
f r f i  t t  t rit  t  t i  i  t t   t  t   i  
t t rtered i tit ti           
. 
 , ,  l   
:// .csbs.org ti s"  s  s" 
rli ) [ r i ft r t r , , r  l ].    l t  ir  ti , i  
i  i tifi    f r f l t   t  t t  i  t , i i  t  t t  ti e  
   is rs." 
tt :// .csbs.org (f ll  l t r  ff ir  li  l t i it  . , . t  
i f r ti  t t  r i ti , issi ,  i iti ti s f    f  t its sit , 
. s. r . 
  l i tion  l  
's i i  i  t  t  t    i ti  t    t  ti s  
l s  t  i  t t       i ilit     
   , ." , 
r ,    
   it : . rmr. r . 
.    i ti  ,   
 .  ( );  r ti  r r,  . . .  . I( ) ( ).  . . r  rt 
l  t  '          i   
ti ll - rtered i i l i tit ti  i  tt  . i  k. . .,  . t. ,  
(2007). nother case decided subsequent t  lters t at e i its t e fe eral a e cies' a ressi e 
i ti    ti    ter  t ge . ndra, . .    
),     t  i   t. I  t t , t   il   i  i   lf 
 t  t  , i  t t l i   i  t   
l    i  i    
 l       
. . l  ,  . . d  .  ).   l  
t t rt r '  l  i  t  i  t  t i  ti   l   t    
f   i   i  t   t , t it i     t  t  l 
r ti . rter ,  . .  t - .  r ti  i   tt t  i i i t 
l rl  tt ti , i l i  ri t er . t , tion.  t ry.  tory 
i   i  t   eral l tors iti  f  t    ,  M.  
. SIS  
3
Wilson,: All Things Considered:  The Contribution of the National Mortgage
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
federalism, on the other hand, which affirms the independent
sovereignty of each state.
Despite these complications, the CSBS/AARMR National
Mortgage Licensing System (NMLS or the "System") contributes to
the goal of reducing predatory lending by strengthening the
regulatory oversight of residential mortgage brokers and eligible
mortgage lenders.10 Strengthened oversight of mortgage brokers is
warranted given the extent of their involvement in residential
mortgage loan originations," the unique access to consumers that
enables them to influence consumer decisions, 12 and the unfortunate
involvement of too many brokers in abusive lending.' 3 Oversight of
10. For a discussion of state-level mortgage broker licensure statutes, see Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., A
Taxonomic Analysis of Mortgage Broker Licensing Statutes: Developing a Programmatic Response to
Predatory Lending, 36 N.M. L. REV. 297 (2006). For a discussion of proposals for federal-level
registration of mortgage brokers, including a nationwide database of licensees, see Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr.,
Sometimes Less is More: Utility, Preemption & Hermeneutical Criticisms of Proposed Federal
Regulation of Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REv. 61 (2007).
11. The National Association of Mortgage Brokers proudly proclaims that mortgage brokers
originate approximately 70% of all residential mortgage loans. See NAMB Model State Statute
Initiative--Licensing, Pre-Licensure Education and Continuing Education for All Originators: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs.,
109th Cong., app. A (Sept. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Licensing and Registration Hearing] (testimony of
Joseph L. Falk). NAMB's claims are supported by the Mortgage Bankers Association, which finds that
mortgage brokers generate 71% of loans in the subprime market. See Mike Fratantoni, Residential
Mortgage Origination Channels, MBA RESEARCH DATA NOTES, Sept. 2006, http://mortgagebankers.
org/f les/Builetin/IntemalResource/44664_September2OO6-ResidentialMortgageOriginationChannes.pdf.
Recently, the number of subprime loans originated by brokers has declined. See Press Release, NAMB,
NAMB Releases New Trend Data on 2007 Mortgage Markets (July 24, 2007), available at
http://www.namb.org/namb/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&ID=210&SnID=186907857 ("new trend
data .. .shows mortgage brokers continue to close fewer non-traditional or 'subprime' loans than in
2006."). A decline in real numbers of originations may be explained by a tightening of credit availability
due to shrinking capital liquidity and thus says nothing about the percentage of mortgage broker
involvement in those subprime mortgage loans that are closed.
12. A mortgage broker's ability to influence consumers and to exploit consumer trust in the broker
can be seen as one of the motivating influences behind the recently introduced Borrower's Protection
Act, which seeks to establish a fiduciary duty for mortgage brokers and other non-bank mortgage
originators. S. 1299, 1 10th Cong. (2007). For an extended discussion of the desirability of imposing
fiduciary duties on mortgage brokers via a borrower's agency regime, see Wilson, supra note 5. For an
analysis of default rates on broker-originated loans compared to retail-originated loans, see BARRETT A.
SLADE, SCOTT D. GRIMSHAW, GRANT RICHARD MCQUEEN & WILLIAM P. ALEXANDER, SOME LOANS
ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: THIRD-PARTY ORIGINATIONS AND DEFAULTS IN THE SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE INDUSTRY (2001), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=281233.
13. Anecdotal evidennce of abusive broker practices can be found in many consumer narratives of
the mortgage lending process. See, e.g., Center for Responsible Lending, The Victims of Predatory
Mortgage Lending, http://www.responsiblelending.org (follow "Our Issues" hyperlink; follow
[Vol. 24:415
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THE NMLS AND PREDATORY LENDING
mortgage lenders by state regulators is necessary to reach those
lenders who are not regulated by federal agencies. Without some
form of state action, both groups would be unregulated with regard to
such important matters as qualifications to enter the industry,
appropriate standards of conduct when dealing with consumers, and
sanctions for misconduct.
14
The ability of the NMLS to contribute to consumer protection does
not mean, however, that the complicating factors of conflicting
constituent interests, vertical federalism, and horizontal federalism do
not impact the System and limit, at least to some extent, its methods
and goals. It is undeniable, for example, that the NMLS's
accommodation of jurisdiction-specific licensing requirements
compromises the goal of uniformity for the license application and
renewal forms. On this point, the objections of mortgage industry
representatives must be acknowledged and considered. At the same
time, it should be recognized that the bulk of the industry's objections
either understate the benefits that can accrue from the NMLS or
overstate its shortcomings. On balance, the NMLS is a worthwhile
and needed initiative as it augments the ability of state regulators to
discharge their gatekeeping and oversight functions, helps consumers
to identify and avoid licensees who have engaged in abusive
practices, and eases compliance burdens for licensees who originate
or fund loans in more than one state.
The analysis of the NMLS in this Article proceeds in three parts.
Part I identifies the goals of the NMLS and the mechanisms by which
it seeks to accomplish them. Part II identifies the limitations of the
"Mortgage Lending" hyperlink; then follow "Borrower Stories" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
Broker involvement in predatory lending is also noted in some state mortgage broker licensing statutes.
For example, the preamble to Minnesota's statute says that one of its goals is to "help consumers avoid
being victimized by unscrupulous ... mortgage brokers." MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 58.10 (3) (West 2002).
See generally Wilson, A Taxonomic Analysis of Mortgage Broker Licensing Statutes, supra note 10, at
297.
14. NAMB disputes the statement that mortgage brokers are unregulated. See Subprime and
Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, app. B at 56 (testimony of Harry H. Dinham, NAMB
President). However, in the absence of state licensing statutes, there would be little regulation of
mortgage brokers qua brokers, leaving them subject only to the requirements of broadly applicable
mortgage lending laws such as RESPA, TILA, and HOEPA.
20071
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NMLS that are de-emphasized by CSBS/AARMR but accentuated by
mortgage industry participants, most notably the National
Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) 15 and the Mortgage
Bankers Association (MBA). 16 Part III provides a critical analysis of
the NMLS, including NAMB's and MBA's criticisms. The Article
concludes by identifying some of the institutional advantages the
NMLS enjoys as a state-level initiative over federal-level regulation
and by encouraging support for the NMLS.
I. THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE LICENSING SYSTEM: STRUCTURE,
PROCEDURES, AND BENEFITS CLAIMED BY REGULATORS
The NMLS has two principal components: (1) uniform license
application and license renewal forms, which an applicant or licensee
will be able to file electronically at a single location even if the
applicant or licensee wishes to conduct business in multiple states,
17
and (2) a centralized database that will include the names of all
licensees and will identify publicly adjudicated enforcement actions
taken against a licensee. 18 Each component has its own advantages
and limitations, so each will be analyzed individually in this Article.
This separation is made for analytical ease, however, and should not
be seen as implying that the uniform forms and the database are two
15. NAMB describes itself as "the voice of the mortgage broker industry, representing the interests
of mortgage brokers and homebuyers." NAMB homepage, http://www.namb.org (follow "about
NAMB" hyperlink). NAMB claims 25,000 members and is "affiliated with all 50 state associations and
the District of Columbia." Id.
16. MBA describes itself as "the national association representing the real estate finance industry, an
industry that employs more than 500,000 people in virtually every community in the country," claiming
"over 3,000 member companies, including all elements of real estate finance: mortgage companies,
mortgage brokers, commercial banks, thrifts, life insurance companies and others in the mortgage
lending field." MBA homepage, http://www.mbaa.org/AboutMBA (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
17. See, e.g., October 4, 2006, Press Release, supra note 7; Subprime and Predatory Lending
Hearing, supra note 4, at 8 (testimony of Steven L. Antonakes of CSBS) ("[Tihis system will create a
single record for every state-licensed mortgage company, branch, and individual that will be shared by
all participating states."); Licensing and Registration Hearing, supra note 11, at 103 (testimony of
Joseph A. Smith, Jr., of CSBS) ("AARMR has developed a set of principles and examination procedures
that would allow state regulators to coordinate on examinations of multi-state mortgage lenders.").
18. See October 4, 2006, Press Release, supra note 7; Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing,
supra note 4, at 8 (testimony of Steven L. Antonakes of CSBS).
[Vol. 24:415
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separate proposals, for they are not. They are two integrated aspects
of a single proposal.
A. The Uniform Mortgage Licensing Forms
1. The MU Forms-Content
The NMLS uses four forms-called MU Forms-for license
application and renewal by mortgage brokers and covered lenders: 1 9
(1) The Uniform Mortgage Lender/Mortgage Broker
Business Application Form, known as Form MU1;
(2) The Uniform Mortgage Biographical Statement &
Consent Form, known as Form MU2;
(3) The Uniform Mortgage Branch Office Form, known as
Form MU3; and
(4) The Uniform Individual Mortgage License/Registration
& Consent Form, known as Form MU4
Form MU1 consists of eleven pages of questions about the applicant
or licensee. For first-time license applicants, the general purpose of
these questions is to provide the regulator with sufficient information
to determine whether the applicant meets the state's requirements for
licensure. In other words, the questions enable the state to perform a
gatekeeping function, granting a license to those applicants who do
not appear to pose a threat to consumers and denying a license to
those applicants who do.20 For licensees seeking to renew an existing
license, the Form MU questions provide information that enables
the regulator to determine whether the licensee is conducting
19. The MU Forms are available at http://www.stateregulatoryregistry.org/AM/Template.cftr?
Section=MUForms (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). See Form MUI, Uniform Mortgage Lender/Mortgage
Broker Form [hereinafter Form MUI]; Form MU2, Uniform Mortgage Biographical Statement &
Consent Form [hereinafter Form MU2]; Form MU3, Uniform Mortgage Branch Office Form
[hereinafter Form MU3]; Form MU4, Uniform Individual Mortgage License/Registration & Consent
Form [hereinafter Form MU4].
20. For a discussion of the gatekeeping function served by state mortgage broker licensing laws, see
Wilson, A Taxonomic Analysis of Mortgage Broker Licensing Statutes, supra note 10, at 300-11.
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business in an acceptable manner. In other words, the questions
enable the state to perform a regulatory oversight function.2'
Some of the Form MU1 questions seek basic and routine
information about the applicant or licensee, such as name, business
location, contact information, the form of business organization that
is or will be used, the states in which the applicant intends to do
business, and a description of the types of mortgage products and
services the applicant or licensee intends to provide. Other questions
ask about the existence of any "control relationship ' 22 between the
applicant or licensee and any other person or entity "engaged in the
business of a mortgage lender, mortgage broker, or providers of other
settlement services." 23 With regard to disclosures about the personal
history and business background of an applicant or licensee, perhaps
the most important question in Form MU1 is question eight, which
requires the applicant or licensee to make eighteen separate
disclosures in four subject categories: (1) Criminal Disclosures; (2)
Regulatory Action Disclosures; (3) Civil Judicial Disclosures; and (4)
Financial Disclosures.
Form MU1 also contains three schedules that seek additional
information about persons who occupy a position or possess a status
that empowers them to influence a licensee or a licensee's business.
Schedule A requires the applicant or licensee to list the names, title or
status, percentage of ownership, public trading standing, and IRS tax
number or employer identification number for all persons who
qualify as an executive officer or direct owner of the applicant.24 This
requirement also applies to each control person, 25 which in the case
of a corporation, partnership, LLC, or trust includes each person who
has an ownership interest of 10% or more.26 Schedule B requires the
21. For a discussion of the administrative oversight function served by state mortgage broker
licensing laws, see id. at 311-25.
22. The term "control relationship" is defined and its importance to the NMLS is discussed infra
notes 23 to 26 and accompanying text.
23. Form MUI, supranote 19, at 7.
24. Form MUI, supra note 19, at Schedule A, 9.
25. The terms "control person" and "control" are more fully defined in the instructions that
accompany Form MU I. See Form MU I, supra note 19, at 2.
26. Id.
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applicant to disclose information about all indirect owners, which
includes all persons who have an ownership interest of 25% more in
27any of the direct owners identified on Schedule A. Disclosure of
indirect ownership must "[c]ontinue up the chain of ownership listing
all 25% or more owners at each level" until "a public reporting
company is reached., 28 Schedule C is used to make amendments to
schedules A and B. By requiring disclosure of the information sought
on Schedules A, B, and C, the NMLS recognizes that the gatekeeping
and oversight functions of regulation are fully discharged only if a
state looks beyond the nominal licensee to insure that financial
predators are not in charge from behind the scenes. Mortgage lenders
and mortgage brokers, while not expressly antagonistic to the goal,
object to the breadth and intrusiveness of information required by
Form MU1.
Each person identified as a control person on Schedule A of Form
MU1 must also file Form MU2. Persons listed on Schedule B are not
required-at least by the MU Form instructions 29 -to complete Form
MU2, which consists of a series of biographical disclosures and a
consent for release of information. Each control person must disclose
residential history and employment history for the past ten years and
disclose details about all other businesses in which the control person
is involved. Each control person must also answer thirty questions
relating to financial, criminal, regulatory, civil judicial, and customer-
initiated arbitration proceedings and to the circumstances of any
employment termination. These disclosure requirements are not only
more numerous than those in question eight of From MUl, they are
also more comprehensive. For example, while the section of Form
MU2 relating to financial proceedings disclosures is limited to the
27. Form MU1, supra note 19, at Schedule B, 10.
28. Id.
29. Mortgage lending industry participants identify the option for states to expand the scope of
persons who must complete the biographical disclosures of Form MU2 as one of the deficiencies of the
NMLS and its MU Forms. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
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prior ten years, the other disclosures are subject to no time
limitation.
30
Each control person must also sign a consent form that provides:
I authorize all my current and former employers, law enforce-
ment agencies, and any other person to furnish to any jurisdic-
tion, or any agent acting on its behalf, any information they have,
including without limitation my creditworthiness, character,
ability, business activities, educational background, general
reputation, history of my employment and, in the case of former
employers, complete reasons for my termination.
3 1
Unsurprisingly, mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers challenge the
breadth of these required disclosures and the consent.
Form MU3 seeks fundamental information about branch offices
that the applicant or licensee intends to operate, such as the address
for the branch office, the name of the branch manager and contact
information, the physical address where the books and records
generated by the branch office will be kept, contact information for
the records custodian, and the extent to which the main office will
manage business affairs at the branch. Despite the comparatively
unremarkable nature of the information sought, Form MU3 has
nonetheless generated opposition due to the non-uniformity of
underlying state substantive law requirements that continue to apply
as permitted jurisdiction-specific requirements. 32
Form MU4 mirrors the disclosure requirements of Form MU2 and
contains the same consent for release of information. 33 However,
whereas Form MU2 is required only of the control persons listed on
Schedule A of Form MIU1, Form MU4-if it is required by a state-
must be completed by individual brokers and loan officers. By
30. The criminal, regulatory, civil judicial, and customer-initiated proceedings are each introduced
with the phrase, "have you ever ... " Form MU2, supra note 19, at 5.
31. Id. at 3 (emphasis deleted).
32. For a discussion of these and other variations among the requirements of state broker licensing
statutes, see Wilson, A Taxonomic Analysis of Mortgage Broker Licensing Statutes, supra note 10.
33. Compare Form MU4, supra note 19, at 8, with Form MU2, supra note 19, at 3.
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requiring information from more people, Form MU4 magnifies the
concerns expressed with regard to Form MU2 about the breadth and
intrusiveness of the disclosures. Furthermore, because under the
NMLS states may or may not require Form MU4, lenders and brokers
have criticized the form for perpetuating the compliance burdens
imposed on licensees by a "patchwork" of inconsistent state laws.
Each of the objections of mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers to
the content of the MU Forms is considered in detail in Part II below.
2. The MU Forms-Single Entry Point Filing Procedures
One of the goals of the NMLS is to streamline the licensing
process for both licensees and regulators by providing standardized
forms and a single filing location. Four states-Idaho, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Washington-adopted the initial paper format
version of the MU Forms. 34 Those forms were updated on January
17, 2007, and as of November of 2007 they were in use in fourteen
states.35 In paper format, the MU Forms promote standardization as
they are designed so that a company, branch, or individual applying
for a license need only complete one MU Form and then submit
copies of that form to each state in which it is seeking a license or for
which it is updating an existing license. 36 As of November of 2007,
"40 state agencies including the District of Columbia have signed
onto a Statement of Intent formally announcing their intent to
participate in the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System."
37
The application process with be further streamlined when an online
application system replaces the paper forms, scheduled to occur on
34. See CSBS/AARMR NATIONAL MORTGAGE LICENSING SYSTEM, AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS FORUM 13 (2006), http://www.afsaonline.org/CMS/fileREPOSITORY/BillMatthewsSavannah.
pdf [hereinafter AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FORUM].
35. CSBS, Project Status (Aug. 2007) http://www.csbs.org [hereinafter CSBS Project Status] (follow
"Mortgage Licensing" hyperlink; follow "About the NMLS" hyperlink; then follow "Project Status"
hyperlink). The number of states and agencies cited in this Article as participating in the NMLS is
accurate as of the end of 2007, but as it is likely that additional states and agencies will commit to the
System in 2008 and beyond, the reader is advised to consult the Project Status page for up-to-date
information.
36. See AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FORUM, supra note 34, at 15.
37. CSBS Project Status, supra note 35.
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January 2, 2008.38 The online application procedure will create a
single filing destination regardless of the number of states in which
an applicant or licensee intends to conduct business.39 The NMLS
will electronically transmit completed applications to each selected
jurisdiction, will collect and transmit applicable state license fees,
and will identify relevant state-specific requirements.4 °
CSBS/AARMR anticipates that "four to six state agencies will
implement the online application procedure as soon as it is
operational and that additional states will transition onto the system
on a quarterly basis during 2008 and 2009.
' 41
3. The NALS-Stated Goals and Benefits
Stated most broadly, the goal of the NMLS is to "creat[e] a unified
and modem system of state mortgage supervision ' 42 that accounts for
the changes that have taken place in the residential mortgage industry
over the past twenty years in the wake of deregulation. These changes
include the greatly expanded use of third-party loan originators, the
increased quality control issues that arise from outsourcing loan
originations to those third parties, the expansion of product lines to
include an ever-increasing number of financing options, and the
greatly increased number of mortgage lenders and brokers who
conduct business on a multi-state or national basis.43 In the view of
state regulators, these changes call for collaborative initiatives by the
states and for new tools if regulation is to be effective. More
particularly stated, the goals of the NMLS are:
38. Id.
39. AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FORUM, supra note 34, at 15.
40. Id. at 16.
41. CSBS Project Status, supra note 35.
42. Press Release, CSBS, 29 State Agencies Announce Commitment to Participate in CSBS-
AARMR Mortgage Licensing System, Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.csbs.org (follow "Public Relations"
hyperlink; follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; follow "29 State Agencies Announce Commitment to
Participate in CSBS-AARMR Mortgage Licensing System" hyperlink) [hereinafter CSBS February 27,
2007, Press Release].
43. AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FORUM, supra note 34, at 6.
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[1] To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state
supervision of the U.S. mortgage market;
[2] To fight mortgage fraud and predatory lending that costs
consumers and the mortgage industry hundreds of
millions of dollars in losses each year;
[3] To increase accountability among mortgage industry
professionals; [and]
[4] To unify and streamline state license processes for
mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers.
44
The NMLS thus anticipates benefiting three constituencies-state
regulators, consumers of mortgage financing products and services,
and mortgage industry licensees. The principal benefits for state
regulators are improved oversight capacity and cost savings. Over-
sight capacity will be improved in two ways. First, according to
CSBS/AARMR, the MU Forms "will improve consistency across
state lines as to the type and quality of information being provided to
mortgage regulators, 45 which can produce heightened state expecta-
tions and an accompanying heightened level of professionalism by
licensees. Second, CSBS/AARMR asserts that by creating a single
record for every licensee and sharing that record among the states,
regulators will be able to track "companies and individuals ... across
state lines and over any period of time. 'A6 This tracking ability will
44. CSBS Press Release, February 27, 2007, supra note 42.
45. Press Release, Ky. Office of Fin. Insts., Office of Financial Institutions Adopts National Uniform
Mortgage Licensing Forms, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.kentucky.gov/Newsroom/
eppcoft/OFI MortgageLicensingForms.htm [hereinafter Kentucky News Release]. Several states
that committed to participating in the NMLS also issued press releases around the same time. Examples
include a February 27, 2007, press release from Idaho, http://finance.idaho.gov/PR/2007/CSBS_
MortgageProj2-07_Final.pdf; a February 27, 2007, press release from Iowa, http://www.idob.state.ia.
us/bank/docs/bulletin/2007/csbs-aarmr-NMLSNMLS.pdf (link not active as of Nov. 5, 2007); a March
26, 2007, press release from Louisiana, http://www.ofi.louisiana. gov/Press%20 Release%20-%2ONew
%20Mortgage%2OApps.pdf; a February 28, 2007, press release from Michigan, http://www.michigan.
gov/printerFriendly/0,1687,7-154-10555-163208--,00.html; and a February 27, 2007, press release from
Montana, http://banking.mt.gov/pdf/MortgageLicensingSystemPressRelease.pdf These releases, and
those of other states, are substantively identical to each other and to the CSBS February 27, 2007, Press
Release, supra note 42.
46. Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 8 (testimony of Steven L.
Antonakes).
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enable state regulators to address geographic and distribution channel
migration by licensees who employ abusive practices.
47
CSBS/AARMR claims that the NMLS will produce cost savings
for regulators as it will "streamline the licensing process for state
agencies ... through the use of modem technology and centralizing
redundant state agency operations." 48  The efficiencies that
accompany streamlining and centralization will reduce staffing
requirements and other administrative expenses for participating state
agencies. An important by-product of these cost savings will be a
state's ability to "divert resources previously used for processing
applications to more supervision and enforcement."4
9
The benefits of the MU Forms to consumers are derivative of the
benefits to state regulators. The better states can discharge their
gatekeeping functions, the more likely it is that abusive brokers and
lenders will be excluded from the marketplace and precluded from
having access to consumers. Further, the more money a state can
divert from administrative processing to enforcement, the more likely
it is that regulators can find and expel from the marketplace those
licensees who are guilty of abusive practices, can impose fines and
other available sanctions, and can obtain compensation for victimized
consumers. 50 It is in this way, along with the nationwide database
47. Geographic migration refers to the potential for a broker or loan originator who has engaged in
predatory activities in one state to relocate to another state and commence business. The NMLS database
addresses this problem by publishing the names of all licensed mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers
and all publicly adjudicated claims against them. See infra notes 107-117 and 202-204 and
accompanying text. Distribution channel migration occurs when a loan originator who engaged in
predatory activities while working for an employer subject to institutional-level licensing takes a job as a
loan originator in a context where licensing requirements are imposed at an individual level, or vice
versa. In geographic migration, it is poor communication between the states that permits an abusive
licensee to escape from past behaviors. In distribution channel migration, it is the lack of individual-
level licensure for some loan originators that enables an abusive originator to move undetected between
distribution channels. The MU4 Form provides states with the option of individual-level licensing, but
that option implicates issues about non-uniformity as some states adopt the MU4 Form and others do
not.
48. October 4, 2006, Press Release, supra note 7.
49. Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Steven L.
Antonakes).
50. For a discussion of the sanctions and remedies that state licensing laws provide to regulators and
consumers for licensee misconduct see Wilson, A Taxonomic Analysis of Mortgage Broker Licensing
Statutes, supra note 10, at 317-21.
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discussed below, that the NMLS pursues its goal of increasing
accountability among mortgage industry professionals.
For licensees, the principal purported benefits of the MU Forms
are convenience and cost savings, which are expected to arise in two
ways. First, the online form submission process and the single point
of entry into the regulatory regime will produce cost savings by
introducing administrative efficiencies. 51 Second, the standardized
MU Forms introduce regulatory compliance efficiencies by easing
the burden that results from the diverse filing requirements currently
imposed by individual states. Licensees have long complained about
"a non-uniform patchwork of unrealistic laws" to which they are
subject,52 a concern that the implementation of a single set of
regulatory forms on a multi-state basis is intended to address.
However, mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers question the extent
to which the MU Forms will actually produce cost savings or
compliance burden relief; those objections are considered in Part II
below.
B. The Nationwide Database of Mortgage Professionals
1. Operation and Stated Benefits
The second principal component of the NMLS is an online data-
base accessible by the public. This database will contain the names of
all licensees who conduct business in participating states and will
serve as a central repository of license information and of publicly
51. Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Steven L. Antonakes
identifying "immediate and profound benefits to consumers, the industry, and the state supervisory
agencies").
52. Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending Initiatives, Legislation and Litigation: Federal
Regulation, State Law and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 78, 86 (2002); see also Building
Sustainable Homeownership-Responsible Lending and the Informed Consumer Choice: Hearing
Before the Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta at 36 (July 11, 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/
publichearings/hoepa/2006/20060711/transcript.pdf [hereinafter FRB Sustainable Homeownership
Forum, July 11, 2006] (testimony of Wright Andrews, Washington Counsel to the National Home
Equity Mortgage Association); Licensing and Registration Hearing, supra note 11, at 47 (testimony of
Teresa Bryce, Mortgage Bankers Association).
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adjudicated actions involving licensees. 53 The NMLS database will
be modeled after the centralized, multi-state databases that have been
implemented in the securities and insurance industries,54 and CSBS/
AARMR has contracted with the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) to develop and operate the NMLS database.55
NASD was chosen because of the database management expertise it
has gained from operating two multi-state licensing databases-the
Central Registration Depository for securities advisors and the Invest-
ment Advisors Registration Depository for investment advisors 56 -
and because of its reputation as a "substantial and credible" organiza-
tion capable of managing data effectively and securely.57 NASD
expected to deploy the database in January 2008.58
As with the MU Forms, CSBS/AARMR believes that the NMLS
database will benefit state regulators, consumers, and mortgage
lenders and brokers. State regulators are expected to benefit from the
database as it will enhance their ability to "share information with
other states," 59  thereby enabling states to address geographic
migration of licensees who have engaged in abusive conduct.
53. October 4, 2006, Press Release, supra note 7; Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra
note 4, at 9 (testimony of Steven L. Antonakes).
54. Texas Finance Commission Meeting Minutes, June 8, 2006, at 2, http://www.fc.state.tex.us
(under "Meetings," follow "Prior" hyperlink; then follow June 8, 2007 "Finance Commission Minutes"
hyperlink).
55. NASD is now known as The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). FINRA was
formed in July of 2007 "through the consolidation of NASD and the member regulation, enforcement
and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange." FINRA homepage, http://www.finra.
org/AboutF1NRA/Corporatelnformation/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). FINRA is "the largest
non-governmental regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States" and "oversees
over 5,000 brokerage firms, about 172,000 branch offices and more than 676,000 registered securities
representatives." Id. The acronym NASD will be retained in this Article to maintain consistency with the
CSBS/AARMR, MBA, and NAMB documents cited herein.
56. AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FORUM, supra note 34, at 21; see also Subprime and
Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Steven L. Antonakes).
57. AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FORUM, supra note 34, at 21; see also Subprime and
Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Steven L. Antonakes).
58. October 4, 2006, Press Release, supra note 7.
59. Building Sustainable Homeownership-Responsible Lending and Informed Consumer Choice:
Hearings Before the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (June 9, 2006), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/events/publichearings/hoepai2006/20060609/transcript.pdf, at 100 [hereinafter FRB Sustainable
Homeownership Forum, June 9, 2006] (testimony of David Bleicken, Director, Bureau of Licensing,
Investigation and Consumer Services).
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Consumers are expected to benefit as the database will be a central
information source that will provide consumers with a way "to check
on the license status of the mortgage broker or lender they wish to do
business with, as well as a way to determine whether a state has taken
enforcement action against that company or individual. 6 ° In the
latter sense, the database seeks to empower consumers by making
them more informed.
Mortgage lending or brokering companies could similarly benefit
from the database by using it as part of their background check and
pre-employment screening of potential new employees.61 To the
extent that the database reduces a licensee's ability to hide abusive
practices, whether from regulators, consumers, or employers, it too
furthers the NMLS goal of "hold[ing] industry professionals
accountable for their actions.' 62 Licensees criticize the database,
saying that it is an excessive invasion of privacy, fails to adequately
address the potential for security breaches, and can include unreliable
information; these criticisms are considered in the following section.
II. CRITICISMS OF THE NMLS: TESTING THE PROPONENT'S CLAIMS
CSBS/AARMR confidently asserts the anticipated benefits of the
NMLS, but how well do those claims stand up under scrutiny? There
60. Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Steven L.
Antonakes).
61. CSBS/AARMR does not mention this employee screening use of NMLS database information.
A bill introduced in the 109th Congress, H.R. 1295, also known as the Responsible Lending Act or the
Ney-Kanjorski bill, contained a proposal for federal licensing requirements and minimum standards for
mortgage brokers (but not other mortgage loan originators) and a federal database containing
information about each licensee. The database proposal in H.R. 1295 sets up a hierarchy of information
and of persons who have access to that information. See H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. § 501 (2005). In
general, the categories are: the public, persons using or intending to use the services of a mortgage
broker, employers and potential employers, and federal and state regulators. Id. Access to information
becomes more restricted as the information becomes more sensitive. Id. For a discussion of the database
proposed in Title V of H.R. 1295 (and of "stealth preemption" and other provisions in the bill that are
antagonistic to the interests of consumers), see Wilson, Sometimes Less is More, supra note 10, at 66.
62. October 4, 2006, Press Release, supra note 7. As one of four principal reasons cited by
CSBS/ARRMR to support participation in the NMLS, this goal is often mentioned in public comments
or testimony. See, e.g., Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 251 (testimony of
Steven L. Antonakes).
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is no shortage of criticisms from MBA and NAMB, who with one
notable exception object to the NMLS on similar grounds. These
objections are perhaps to be expected as they are made by those
mortgage industry participants who will be subject to new or
heightened regulations. However, while the presence of industry self-
interest may justify a heightened sense of skepticism, it does not
automatically invalidate MBA's and NAMB's observations. That at
least one state regulator has expressed somewhat similar reservations
further supports a considered examination of industry criticisms.
The mortgage lending industry has criticized the NMLS on eight
grounds, which are:
1. The NMLS provides insufficient compliance burden
relief because the MU Forms are not truly uniform
across participating states;
2. The disclosure requirements of the MU Forms are overly
burdensome and overly invasive and require more
extensive disclosures than some participating states;
3. The disclosure requirements of the MU Forms are an
unwarranted invasion of privacy;
4. The delegation of database management to a third-party
contractor creates the potential for security breaches and
for the inappropriate disclosure of personal information
about a licensee;
5. The NMLS does not contain any mechanism by which a
licensee can challenge adverse information reported to
the database;
6. The cost of the NMLS exceeds any savings licensees
will realize;
7. There has been inadequate industry input in the
development of the NMLS; and
8. The NMLS displays channel bias as it favors one loan
origination channel over a competing channel.
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Concerns expressed from the vantage point of one state regulator
are:
1. The database provides questionable marginal utility over
existing information-gathering methods;
2. Participation in the NMLS will require passage of
enabling legislation that may be politically difficult to
achieve; and
3. Any cost savings to be realized by participating in the
NMLS could be lost to the need for additional
appropriations and staffing.
The remainder of Part II of the Article elaborates on these
criticisms. A critical evaluation follows in Part 1II.
A. Mortgage Industry Criticisms
Concise statements of the mortgage industry's criticisms of the
NMLS are found in a memorandum the National Association of
Mortgage Brokers released in September of 2006 (NAMB Position
Statement) 63 and in a memorandum the Mortgage Bankers Associa-
tion issued around the same time (MBA Issue Paper).64 In its Position
Statement, NAMB outlines its objections to the NMLS and
announces a statement of principles that was drafted for the express
63. NAMB memorandum, CSBS & AARMR Establish "State Regulatory Registry," http'//www.
namb.org/'Iages/namb/GovemmentAffairs/Word_From_WashingtoWWFW%202006-12%20(CSBS%20
Broker % 20 Registry).pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) [hereinafter NAMB Position Statement]. Interestingly, this
document exists in another, untitled, form, available at http'//www.namb.org/Images/namb/Government
Affairs/CSBSAARMR/CSBSAARMRStatemen%20FinalNov42006.pdf (Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter
NAMB Untitled Position Statement]. While the NAMB Untitled Position Statement contains some
language that is noticeably more caustic than the NAMB Position Statement, the former excludes the
institutional commitment to oppose enabling legislation that would implement any licensing or
registration system inconsistent with NAMB's positions. Based on this difference and other clues
internal to the documents, the NAMB Untitled Position Statement is likely an earlier draft of the NAMB
Position Statement. The NAMB Position Statement is undated; the NAMB Untitled Position Statement
is dated.
64. Mortgage Bankers Association Issue Paper, "CSBS/AARMR Proposed State Licensing Data-
base," (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter MBA Issue Paper], http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Library/Issue
Papers/CSBS-AARMRProposedStateLicensingDatabase.pdf.
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purpose of "ensur[ing] that there are no misunderstandings, misinter-
pretations, or misrepresentations of NAMB's policies and positions
regarding the registry and licensing scheme that is currently being
proposed by CSBS/AARMR." 65 Likewise, in its Issue Paper, MBA
expresses its "many concerns" about the ability of the NMLS "to
effectively achieve its stated goals and objectives, as well doubts
about its benefits to regulators and the industry."
66
1. Insufficient Compliance Burden Relief
Along with the broker database, the principal advantage claimed
for the NMLS is that it will "unify and streamline state license
processes for mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers" 67 by using
uniform forms that will "eliminate unnecessary duplication and
implement consistent standards and requirements across state
lines." 68 Mortgage lending industry participants contest this claim.
While uniformity would indeed benefit licensees by reducing the
compliance burden imposed by the disparate licensing requirements
of the various states, NAMB and MBA contend that the promise of
relief is illusory precisely because the MU Forms are not uniform.
They have a point. Although CSBS/AARMR conspicuously states in
the MU Forms that the "uniform" applications are subject to
jurisdiction-specific requirements, that fact is not often acknowledged
apart from those forms. As a result, CSBS/AARMR does indeed
appear to overstate the extent of uniformity and compliance burden
relief the MU Forms will provide-at least initially.69 At the same
time, NAMB and MBA understate the real gains in uniformity that
the MU Forms, even in their current format, do accomplish.
65. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63, at 1.
66. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64, at 1.
67. CSBS February 27, 2007, Press Release, supra note 42.
68. Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Steven L.
Antonakes).
69. As noted at notes 194-196, infra, and accompanying text, CSBS/AARMR's claims cease to be
overstated when the NMLS is seen as a process rather than as a static creation.
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The legitimate component of the mortgage industry's objection
arises from the fact that, while each of the MU Forms may contain
the word "uniform" in its title, the most frequently appearing direc-
tive in the accompanying instructions is, "An applicant must also
refer to jurisdiction-specific requirements published by each jurisdic-
tion in which it is applying., 70 This admonition appears seventeen
times in the instructions for the MU1 Form alone and affects nearly
every aspect of the filing process, including: (1) effective date of the
license application, (2) disclosure update and amendment require-
ments, (3) license surrender and cancellation procedures, (4)
application format, (5) necessary application attachments, (6) in-state
physical presence, (7) applicable fees, (8) trade name registration, (9)
certificate of good standing certification, (10) proof of financial
responsibility, (11) applicability of MU3 Form, and (12) applicability
of MU4 Form.7'
Although no state may impose jurisdiction-specific requirements
for all of these items, where they do exist an applicant cannot rely
merely on submission of the "uniform" MU1 Form. Instead, for each
state in which an applicant wishes to conduct business, he or she
must determine whether it imposes requirements in addition to the
requirements of the MU Forms and then must take the steps
necessary to comply. These jurisdiction-specific requirements often
involve matters of significant importance. Three examples, relating to
personal information disclosure, surety bonds, and conditions for
licensure, will suffice to illustrate the extent to which unique state-
imposed requirements affect the intended uniformity of the MU
Forms.
72
70. Form MUI, supra note 19, at 1-2 (emphasis deleted).
71. Id.
72. A number of other jurisdiction-specific examples could be cited, including length of work
experience required prior to licensure, content of pre-licensure testing, bases for denying a license
application, fingerprint check requirement, nature and number of hours of required continuing
education, license amendment procedures, and license surrender procedures. On this last topic, a
comparison of the jurisdiction-specific procedures in Wyoming (uses only MU Forms) with those in
New Hampshire (MU Forms plus additional state forms and physical surrender of license) demonstrates
the variation in regulations that can exist among the states. Compare State of Wyoming, Uniform
Mortgage License Forms State of Wyoming Specific Requirements, paragraph 2.b., http://audit.state.
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a. Non-uniform Disclosure Requirements
Residential mortgage industry participants criticize the disclosure
requirements of the MU Forms on two distinct grounds. One,
considered in the next subsection, relates to the scope of information
requested. The other, considered here, relates to the scope of persons
who are required to make the disclosures. As demonstrated later in
this Article, the former objection involves competing visions of the
nature and objectives of the NMLS, and the latter objection involves
principles of horizontal and vertical federalism.
As noted in Part I, Form MIi contains a number of questions that
require an applicant to make disclosures about personal history and
business background.73 In addition, Schedule A requires additional
disclosures by "direct owners and executive officers," 74 and Schedule
B requires additional disclosures by "indirect owners." 75 For
purposes of determining which persons are subject to these disclosure
requirements, the MU1 Form defines a direct owner as a "control
person," which in turn is defined as anyone who has the "power,
directly or indirectly, to direct the management or policies of a
company, whether through ownership of securities, by contract, or
,,76otherwise. Power to control is presumed to exist if a person is a
"director, general partner, or executive officer."77 Power to control is
also presumed to exist in any person who has the right to vote or sell
10% or more of a class of voting security in a corporation or the right
to receive 10% or more of the capital of a general partnership, trust,
or limited liability company.78 Schedule B defines an indirect owner
as anyone who has the right to vote or sell 25% or more of the stock
of any corporation listed on Schedule A or the right to receive 25% or
wy.us/banking/mortgage/Wyomingstate specific instructions MU.pdf, with State of New Hampshire,
NH Specific Mortgage Lender/Banker, Mortgage Broker or Mortgage Servicer License/Registration
Application Instructions (July 2007), http://www.nh.gov/banking/AppMtgFormMU 1 andNtlpart2.pdf.
73. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
74. Form MUI, supra note 19, at Schedule A, 9.
75. Form MUI, supra note 19, at Schedule B, 10.
76. Form MUI, supra note 19, at 2. This definition is repeated at item 2 on Schedule A.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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more of the capital of any general partnership, trust, or limited
liability company listed on Schedule A.79 Each person who qualifies
as a control person because he or she is listed on Schedule A must
also complete Form MU2, which requires disclosure of even more
extensive biographical information. Non-control persons and persons
identified on Schedule B are exempted from the additional disclosure
requirements of Form MU2.
From a compliance burden relief standpoint, the problem with the
MU Forms' definition of those persons who are subject to the
disclosure requirements of Form MU2 is that states have the power to
expand the definition to include additional persons not covered by the
NMLS. For example, whereas the Form MU2 instructions state that
only "individuals identified as a control person.., on Schedule A of
Form MU1' 80 need to complete Form MU2, the state of New
Hampshire creates a new class of persons--"principals"--who must
complete it. Under New Hampshire law, a principal includes both
"direct owners of 10% or more and indirect owners of 25% or more
of the applicant." 81 The New Hampshire instructions state in
underlined bold-face print that "[a]ll individuals listed on Schedules
A & B are defined as 'principals' . . . of the applicant and are
therefore considered 'control persons' in New Hampshire."
82
The effect of this jurisdiction-specific requirement is to require the
Form MU2 biographical disclosures from a class of persons,
Schedule B indirect owners, in one state who are not subject to a
similar requirement elsewhere. Furthermore, in addition to being
required to make the Form MIU2 disclosures, indirect owners who
qualify as principals must also meet the New Hampshire-specific
requirements of submitting a Criminal History Record Information
79. Id. at 10.
80. Form MU2, supra note 19, at 1.
81. New Hampshire Specific Mortgage Lender/Banker, Mortgage Broker or Mortgage Servicer
License/Registration Application Instructions (July 2007), http://www.nh.gov/banking/AppMtgForm
MU I andNHPart2.pdf (emphasis deleted) [hereinafter New Hampshire Specific Mortgage Lender].
82. Id. (emphasis deleted).
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Authorization Form and a fingerprint card and of paying a records
check fee.83
b. Surety Bond and Other Non-uniform Filing Requirements
States require mortgage industry licensees to post surety bonds as a
condition of licensure. 84  The bond requirement makes a small
contribution to a state's gatekeeping function as the bond compels a
licensee to subject him or herself to a background check by the
bonding company, which presumably would not agree to be liable on
the bond if the background check revealed adverse information.85 in
addition, the bond requirement serves a regulatory oversight function
by providing a source of recovery for fines imposed by the state and
for damages incurred by consumers. 86 Despite conceptual agreement
among regulators about the advantages of a surety bond, the amount
of the bond and the mechanics of implementing it vary among the
states. For example, a mortgage broker in New Hampshire must post
a surety bond, which covers both the broker's principal office and
any branch offices, in the amount of $20,000.87 In neighboring
Vermont, the required amount is $25,000.88 In Wyoming, a mortgage
broker must post a bond in the amount of $25,000 for the principal
83. Id.
84. State licensing statutes typically require mortgage brokers to post a surety bond. Those statutes
also typically require mortgage lenders to post a surety bond and in addition to provide evidence of net
worth in a stated amount. The amount of the surety bond required of lenders is generally larger than the
bond required of brokers. For the convenience of the reader, the discussion in this subsection is limited
to bond requirements for mortgage brokers. The points made about the variability of mortgage broker
bond requirements could, however, also be made about mortgage lender bond and net worth
requirements.
85. For a discussion of the gatekeeping function of surety bonds, see Wilson, A Taxonomic Analysis
of Mortgage Broker Licensing Statutes, supra note 10, at 300-11.
86. See id. at 319-21.
87. New Hampshire Mortgage Banker/Broker Bond (July 2006), http://www.nh.gov/banking/
MortgageBanker20KBondForm.pdf.
88. Uniform Mortgage License Forms, Jurisdiction Specific Requirements for Vermont, 2.e
(Sept. 20, 2007), http://www.bishca.state.vt.us/BankingDiv/lenderapplic/MUforms/VT_specific MU
requirements.htm#FormMU1.
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office plus $10,000 for each branch office. 89 Next door in Montana,
the bond amount is $25,000 for each location, whether principal or
branch. 90 The bond amount in Washington is determined on a sliding
scale that ranges from a minimum of $20,000 to a maximum of
$60,000 depending on the number of loan originators.
91
Other idiosyncratic filing requirements are also common. They
range from administrative matters, such as the amount of license
application fees ($500 in New Hampshire for the principal office and
for each branch office; 92 $500 for home office plus $50 for each
branch office in Wyoming; 93 $1,875 in North Carolina for the
principal office and $187.50 for each branch office94) to regulatory
oversight requirements, such as fingerprint requirements (required in
most states; 95 not required in Wyoming96) and annual financial state-
ments (audited and prepared in accordance with GAAP principles in
Vermont; 97 unaudited balance sheet only, using either a one and one-
half page state-provided form or "your own format" in Wyoming 98)
to document preservation requirements (twenty-five months in
Wyoming; 99 five years after date of last loan activity in Montana10 0 ).
89. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 40-23-110 (2007); Uniform Mortgage License Forms, State of Wyoming
Specific Requirements, I 2.b, http://audit.state.wy.us/banking/mortgage/Wyomingstatespecific_
instructionsMU1 .pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
90. Montana License Application Requirements, Supplemental Materials, Proof of Surety,
https://doa.mt.gov/bfilicensing/instructions.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
91. Washington Bond Calculation Worksheet, http://www.dfi.wa.gov/cs/pdf/mb/CalculateBond.pdf
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
92. New Hampshire Specific Mortgage Lender, supra note 81, at New Application Instructions.
93. State of Wyoming, supra note 89, 1.
94. North Carolina Mortgage Lending Licensing & Compliance Forms (May 7, 2007),
http://www.nccob.org/NCCOB/Mortgage/FormsFees/.
95. See, e.g., New Hampshire, Criminal History Record Information Authorization Form, Non-
Depository Lender/Broker, Servicer, Retail Seller, Money Transmitter or Debt Adjuster (July 2007),
http://www.nh.gov/banking/CriminalRecordReleaseForm.pdf.
96. Uniform Mortgage License Forms, State of Wyoming Specific Requirements, Form MU2,
http://audit.state.wy.us/banking/mortgage/Wyomingstatespecific-instructionsMU2.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007) ("Wyoming does not require the submission of fingerprint cards.").
97. Uniform Mortgage License Forms, Form MUI Jurisdiction Specific Requirements for Vermont 2.b,
http./www.bishca.state vt.us(BankingDiv/1enderapphcMUfon/VTspecii-MUre ents.han#ForrMUI
(last visited Nov. 3,2007).
98. Uniform Mortgage License Forms, State of Wyoming Specific Requirements: Statement of
Financial Condition (Jan. 27, 2007), http://audit.state.wy.us/banking/mortgage/Statement-of financial-
condition.pdf.
99. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-23-112 (2007).
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Although the NMLS administrator will collect state licensing fees,
which presumably include advising applicants and licensees about the
proper amount to pay, and pledges to identify jurisdiction-specific
requirements, it will still be left to applicants and licensees to comply
with the special demands that individual states may impose.
c. Non-uniform Pre-conditions of Licensure
The jurisdiction-specific requirements also include conditions
precedent to licensure. For instance, in addition to the MU Forms and
the various organizational documents that customarily must be filed
with the secretary of state or similar office prior to conducting
business in a state,' 0' Vermont adds a unique form-the Tax and
Child Support Certification.10 2 This form imposes two conditions on
licensure. The first is that "a license cannot be issued or renewed
until and unless the applicant certifies in writing that it ... is in good
standing with respect to any and all taxes owed to the State of
Vermont."' 0 3 The second is that "[a] license cannot be issued or
renewed until and unless the applicant certifies in writing that he or
she is not subject to a child support order or if subject to ... [one is]
in full compliance."'
0 4
From the standpoint of mortgage brokers and lenders, these
jurisdiction-specific conditions precedent to licensure are problematic
because they impair the uniformity of the MU Forms, which in turn
means that the compliance burden relief promised by uniform forms
is not fully realized. The MBA expresses this concern saying, "MBA
is supportive of the [NMLS] initiative, but is concerned that current
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-9-121 (2007).
101. These documents include certificate of incorporation, certificate of good standing, certificate of
assumed business name, etc. The requirement that such documents be filed with a state should be
excluded from the discussion about the effect of jurisdiction-specific requirements on the uniformity of
the MU Forms as those requirements are not specific to mortgage brokers or lenders and apply to all
business entities.
102. Jurisdiction Specific Forms for Vermont, Tax and Child Support Certification (Oct. 2001),
http://www.bishca.state.vt.us/BankingDiv/lenderapplic/ataxcert.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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state statutes in some states may cripple the initiative from truly
streamlining and unifying state level licensing."',0
5
2. Overly Burdensome Disclosure Requirements
In addition to objecting to the scope of persons who are required to
make the disclosures required by the M Forms, residential mortgage
industry participants also object to the breadth of information that
must be disclosed, especially with regard to question eight of Form
MU1 and with regard to essentially all of Forms MU2 and MfU4.
106
NAMB points to the following required information as examples of
MU Form disclosures that it considers "burdensome and intrusive":
a. Employment history for the previous 10 years, including
any periods of unemployment or part-time employment;
b. Address and residence information for the previous 10
years;
c. Whether individuals have filed for personal bankruptcy
in the previous 10 years; and
d. Whether individuals have ever been charged with a
misdemeanor criminal offense-even if they were never
convicted.'°7
In both the NAMB Position Statement and the MBA Issue Paper,
these disclosure requirements are grouped under the categories of
privacy and security concerns. 10 8 With regard to the latter, NAMB
105. Mortgage Bankers Association, MBA Participates in CSBS' Residential Mortgage Lending
Initiative, MBA NEWSLINK, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.mortgagebankers.org/mbanewslink/
issues/2005/l 2/05.asp [hereinafter MBA NewsLink].
106. For example, regulator websites in North Carolina, Vermont, and Washington provide links to
and instructions for the MU4 Form; regulator websites in New Hampshire and Wyoming do not.
107. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
108. Two additional concerns voiced about the scope of disclosures relate to uneven application
among loan originators and lack of uniformity among state regulations. NAMB contends that "uniform
standards of professionalism and conduct should be developed and applied to every mortgage
originator." NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63. This objection is taken up in subsection 6 below,
which discusses channel bias. The non-uniformity objection rests on the fact that some states require
20071
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states that "[i]t is important to limit the amount of personal
information . . . collected by state regulators and maintained in the
SRR" because the "excessive collection and retention of personal
information makes the database ripe for a potential security breach or
inappropriate disclosure of personal information."' 10 9 This criticism is
considered in the next subsection of this Article.
With regard to concerns about privacy, the principal industry
criticism of the MU forms' disclosure requirements is that they are
more extensive than the disclosure requirements currently in place in
some, or even most, states. In its Position Statement, NAMB notes:
A great deal of the information that originators will provide
regulators on CSBS/AARMR's proposed uniform licensing
forms is not required by the laws of every state. The uniform
licensing forms will enable participating state regulators to
collect personal information from originators that they may be
unauthorized to collect. CSBS and AARMR must ensure that
participating state regulators only collect the information that is
required by the laws of their particular state. "0
MBA also makes this objection in its Issue Paper, stating that
"[t]he proposed forms are largely viewed by the industry as overly
burdensome, as they do not average the regulatory burden of the
states, but instead use the most complex form as a model and
base." '' The "extra" information collected by the MU Forms is
especially problematic for NAMB with regard to disclosures of
licensee misconduct-a matter that has implications for the licensee
database. NAMB observes that "[s]tandards of conduct and pro-
fessionalism vary from state to state, thus the conduct of licensees in
one state may result in a complaint being registered in the SRR, while
Form MU4 and have individual originator licensing while other states do not. This objection is
addressed in subsection 1 above.
109. Id. "SRR" refers to the State Regulatory Registry, LLC, which CSBS/AARMR formed to
manage the national database of mortgage licensees.
110. Id.
111. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64.
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the same conduct in another state would not."' 112 "Who," NAMB
asks, "will determine what negative information should be included
in the database and what should not?"' 1 3 For NAMB, the only
"negative information" that should be disclosed on the MU forms and
that should appear in the SRR is "formally adjudicated disciplinary
actions . . . not mere threats, . . . allegations, or consumer
complaints." 114 On that basis, NAMB objects to the MU Forms'
requirement that a licensee disclose whether he or she has ever been
charged with specified misdemeanors, 15 has ever been named as a
defendant in financial services-related litigation or mediation initiated
by a consumer,' 16 or has ever voluntarily terminated employment
following allegations of wrongdoing.' 17
3. Invasion of Privacy, Risk of Information Inaccuracy, and
Responsibility for Security Breaches
Although frequently listed as separate criticisms of the NMLS,
industry concerns about privacy, inaccuracy, and responsibility for
security breaches are intertwined and will be discussed together. With
regard to privacy concerns, MBA's Issue Paper notes that "[t]he
database will contain a large amount of personal information" and
because the "[c]onstruction and management of the database will be
outsourced to a third party, the NASD,"' 1 8 MBA is concerned that
"the system has the potential for security breach and inappropriate
disclosure of personal data." ' 1 9 NAMB expresses strikingly similar
criticisms in its Position Statement.
120
112. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see Form MUI, supra note 19, at question 8(B)(2); Form MU2, supra note 19, at question
8(G)(2); Form MU4, supra note 19, at question 9(F)(1).
116. See Form MU2, supra note 19, at question 8(L); Form MU4, supra note 19, at question 9(L).
117. See Form MU2, supra note 19, at question 8(M); Form MU4, supra note 19, at question 8(M).
118. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64.
119. Id.
120. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
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In addition to concerns about maintaining the privacy of informa-
tion included in the database, licensees also have concerns about the
accuracy of that information. NAMB observes that "CSBS/AARMR
has not identified how complaints can be filed against licensees."' 12 1 It
asks, "How will complaints be registered on the database and how
long will those complaints reside on the database?"' 122 Additionally,
NAMB notes that "CSBS/AARMR has also failed to establish an
appeals process for licensees who have had a complaint registered
against them in the database."'1 23 According to NAMB, a "formal
appeals process is needed to ensure the accuracy and authenticity of
the information collected and maintained in the SRR."'
12 4
With regard to liability for a breach of database security that
allows private information about a licensee to become public, the
MBA Issue Paper likewise notes that the mortgage industry "has no
relationship with the vendor [NASD] who will construct and manage
the database."' 125 As a result, MBA maintains that it is "unclear who
will be held responsible for security breaches."'
126
4. Expense and Value
The start-up costs for the NMLS have been estimated to be $4.3
million. This expense will be borne by the participating states 127 and
is more of an issue for state regulators as they balance the cost of
participation with expected benefits than it is for mortgage industry
participants. For mortgage industry licensees, it is the annual
operating costs that are the main cause of concern. CSBS/AARMR
estimates the annual operating expense to be $6.5 million. 28 NAMB,
which believes the annual operating costs could be between $6.5
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
125. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64.
126. Id.
127. AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FORUM, supra note 34, at 22.
128. Id.
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million and $7.5 million,' 29 points out that "[t]hese annual operating
costs will be covered by initial set-up fees and application processing
fees, which will be paid by licensees in every participating state."' 3 °
While NAMB emphasizes the size of the expense licensees will be
expected to cover, MBA's criticism goes more to the value expected
to be obtained for the money. Specifically, the criticism contained in
MBA's Issue Paper is that "[i]t is questionable whether there are cost
benefits or efficiencies gained commensurate with such a large
annual cost."
'1 3 1
5. Inadequate Industry Input
NAMB and MBA criticisms of the NMLS are connected to their
perception that the mortgage lending industry has been excluded
from meaningful participation in the development of the System. In
its Position Statement, NAMB states:
In summer 2006-more than eighteen months into the project-
NAMB was asked to participate in a CSBS/AARMR-formed
industry working group. NAMB is pleased to participate in this
process but fears that it is not a full partner in considering this
proposal. NAMB believes that the substantive structure of the
system was developed without any real opportunity for NAMB's
input or concerns to be addressed.
132
NAMB's criticism is relevant because of the impact it could have
on ongoing efforts to finalize the NMLS and to implement it on the
broadest possible basis. In its Position Statement, NAMB describes in
strident terms the conditions of its future involvement. While stating
that it "looks forward to maintaining an open dialogue with CSBS,
AARMR, and the [participating] state regulators,"' 33 NAMB cautions
129. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
130. Id.
131. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64.
132. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
133. Id.
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that its "continued participation in the CSBS/AARMR effort should
not be considered an endorsement of the current proposal."' 3 4 NAMB
then adds an ominous warning, apparently directed at statements it
leaders feel exaggerate claims of industry endorsement of the NMLS:
"NAMB will not tolerate CSBS, AARMR, or any other entity or
representative misrepresenting NAMB's positions and policies on the
proposed registry and licensing scheme."'
135
NAMB's Position Statement confirms the steps it has taken, both
internally and among its state-level affiliates, to institutionalize its
opposition to the NMLS. The Position Statement declares:
On November 4, 2006, the NAMB Delegate Council voted
unanimously to support the tenants [sic] of the NAMB statement
and to present and recommend adoption of the NAMB statement
to all forty-nine state associations. Those states which agree to
adopt this statement are committing to oppose any effort to pass
enabling legislation or regulations that fail to mirror the
principles outlined in the NAMB statement.13
6
For government regulators considering participation in the NMLS,
the political impact of this threat is not inconsequential.1
37
MBA, on the other hand, conditions its support of the NMLS on
the accomplishment of two reforms, one of which is in direct conflict
with the conditions for support imposed by NAMB. MBA states that
for it to support the CSBS/AARMR project there must be "compre-
hensive reform of state licensing'' 138 built around two propositions.
The first proposition relates to an on-going dispute between MBA
and NAMB about the similarity or dissimilarity of mortgage lenders
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
137. For a discussion of the political impact of industry opposition to the NMLS, see discussion of the
Texas Finance Commission Meeting Minutes, infra notes 169-188 and accompanying text.
138. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64.
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and mortgage brokers.' 39 In its Issue Paper, MBA states that a
necessary component of comprehensive licensing reform is:
[A] recognition and application by CSBS/AARMR members of
the concept that there are fundamental differences between
mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers and that those differences
must be recognized and incorporated into any processes that the
project creates including new legislation and/or regulations that
are generated during its implementation. 140
As noted below, MBA contends that the retained investment risk,
reputation concerns, and employee screening practices that apply to
mortgage lenders, but not to mortgage brokers, obviate the need for
the individual-level regulatory oversight that is appropriate for
brokers. 141
The second MBA proposition is even more sweeping and emerges
from tensions between the national and local aspects of the residential
mortgage lending business and between the national and local
interests in regulation. With regard to both business practices and
locus of regulation, MBA emphasizes the national view over the
local. The MBA Issue Paper states that "any new licensing system
that is imposed on the industry must also reflect the fact that the
mortgage banking industry is no longer a state-based industry, but
one that operates on a national and international scope.,, 14' MBA
calls for a regulatory regime that has as its goal "a one-stop shop
where licenses can be obtained from a state utilizing standardized
background checks, one set of fingerprints, and [uniform] minimum
education requirements"'143 and that also standardizes the "various
139. This issue is discussed in detail infra at notes 145-168 and accompanying text.
140. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64.
141. See generally Licensing and Registration Hearing, supra note 11, at app. 42-48 (prepared
statement of Teresa Bryce, Mortgage Bankers Association).
142. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64; see also Licensing and Registration Hearing, supra note 11, at
6 (testimony of Teresa Bryce, Mortgage Bankers Association, describing the modem mortgage loan
market as a "sophisticated residential real estate finance system" that involves "transferring national and
international capital to homebuyers anywhere in the country").
143. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64.
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other state requirements.' ' 144 This one-stop shop could be achieved,
MBA says, either by creating a regulatory regime that is fully
uniform for all states or by creating a fully reciprocal regime,
whereby licensure in any one state would be recognized by all others.
6. Origination Channel Bias
Both MBA and NAMB accuse the NMLS of bias by favoring one
loan origination channel over the other, but they express opposing
opinions about which channel is being treated unfairly. Mortgage
brokers contend they have been "singled-out for inclusion in the
SRR" because the NMLS permits institutional level licensing for
some mortgage originators. Specifically, NAMB contends that the
CSBS/AARMR licensing system must include all loan originators-
"every individual that handles a form 1003 loan application ' 145
-
including "all federal and state-regulated banks, and their
subsidiaries, along with credit unions, mortgage bankers, lenders,
brokers, and all employees of these entities." 146 MBA, on the other
hand, contends that by permitting individual level licensing the
NMLS "automatically favors employee licensing, and does not
recognize the difference between large lenders ... and brokers" and
thus "places lenders at a competitive disadvantage to brokers, who do
not have bonding or net worth requirements.' 47
The question in this conflict is whether state licensing
requirements should be imposed uniformly for all mortgage industry
participants at the individual level or whether institutional differences
justify licensing mortgage lenders at the business entity level while
144. Id.
145. Written Comments of Harry H. Dinham of NAMB, dated Aug. 15, 2006, [hereinafter Dinham
Written Comments] submitted pursuant to request for comment by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to Federal Reserve Board concerning the home equity market and the efficacy
of existing federal and state laws and regulations (Federal Reserve Docket No. OP-1253), at 2, 4 (Aug.
15, 2006).
146. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
147. MBA Issue Paper, supra note 64. It is inaccurate to say that mortgage brokers do not have
bonding requirements. However, it is accurate to say that mortgage lenders are generally required to post
a larger surety bond than mortgage brokers and that mortgage lenders are generally subject to net worth
requirements that do not apply to mortgage brokers.
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licensing mortgage brokers at the individual level. The disagreement
between MBA and NAMB over this question is deep, and the parties
assert their positions whenever possible, as evidenced by testimony at
congressional hearings 148 and by statements made at Federal Reserve
Board public forums. 14
9
NAMB's position is based on its conclusion that the existence of
numerous players who originate loans in today's market has produced
"consumer confusion."' 50 With specific regard to mortgage lenders,
NAMB says "the line between brokers and lenders has been
blurred"'15 1 as mortgage lenders now sell up to 85% of their
residential loans on the secondary market rather than holding the
loans in their own portfolios. 152 Thus, for at least 85% of loans
"mortgage lenders operate functionally in the same manner as
mortgage brokers.' ' 153 Specifically, mortgage lenders and brokers
both "present an array of available loan products to the consumer,
close the loan and then almost instantaneously sell the loan to the
secondary market."'
' 54
MBA sees the situation quite differently. While NAMB focuses on
general similarities between mortgage lenders and brokers, MBA
focuses on concrete differences. In a hearing on Licensing and
Registration in the Mortgage Industry, held by the House
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity in late 2005,
the co-chair of MBA's State Licensing Task Force, Teresa Bryce,
dedicates most of her testimony to the task of distancing mortgage
148. Compare Testimony of Joseph L. Falk of NAMB at the Licensing and Registration Hearing,
supra note 11, with Testimony of Teresa Bryce of MBA at the same hearing.
149. See FRB Sustainable Homeownership Forum, June 9, 2006, supra note 59, at 120-21, 151-53
(comments of Joseph L. Falk of NAMB).
150. Dinham Written Comments, supra note 145, at 7.
151. Id. atn.5.
152. See Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (testimony of Harry H.
Dinham, President of NAMB).
153. Dinham Written Comments, supra note 145, at 7, n.5.
154. Id. at first page of an unnumbered two-page attachment entitled "The Regulation & Oversight of
the Mortgage Broker Industry." There has been significant analysis of the secondary market's role in
predatory lending. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization,
and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503 (2002); Engel & McCoy, supra
note 4; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007).
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lenders from mortgage brokers. Ms. Bryce emphasizes that
"[m]ortgage bankers underwrite applicants and lend their own funds
or funds they have borrowed.' ' 155 Thus, from "the moment a loan has
closed, mortgage bankers assume the credit, interest rate, compliance,
and fraud risk associated with the loan.'
156
Even if a mortgage lender sells a loan on the secondary market,
and thereby transfers the interest rate and credit risk to the buyer, the
lender "maintains nearly all of the quality, compliance, and fraud
risk."' 157 The lender will even retain the interest rate and credit risk,
according to Ms. Bryce, because of representations and warranties
that the secondary market buyer requires. Thus, "[i]f the investor
discovers problems, such as non-compliance with applicable law or
underwriting guidelines, or fraud, the investor can, and typically
does, force the originating mortgage banker to repurchase the
mortgage or enter into an indemnity agreement."' 58 In addition, Ms.
Bryce states that mortgage lenders are subject to "several levels of
regulatory oversight" and to "economic regulation by the
marketplace."'
' 59
By contrast, Ms. Bryce contends that mortgage brokers "do not
have capital at risk in a transaction and their responsibility for a loan
typically ends when a loan closes and they receive payment."' 16 She
adds that mortgage brokers are not subject to federal oversight and,
because mortgage brokers do not have repurchase or indemnity
obligations, are not subject to economic regulation.' 6' Of all the
requirements found in the "thickening web of burdensome state
licensing laws,"' 62 the one Ms. Bryce identifies as particularly
objectionable is some states' movement "beyond mortgage banking
155. Licensing and Registration Hearing, supra note 11, at 2 (testimony of Teresa Bryce, Mortgage
Bankers Association).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 3.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at4.
161. Licensing and Registration Hearing, supra note 11 (testimony of Teresa Bryce, Mortgage
Bankers Association).
162. Id. at8.
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corporate licensing ...[to] requir[ing] the licensure of individual
loan officers."' 163 This movement toward greater state regulation is,
for MBA, both unnecessary and undesirable. It is unnecessary
because of "the accountability that mortgage banking companies have
for their loan officers and employees due to the economic regulation
of the marketplace and the periodic audits by the states them-
selves." 164 Because of this accountability, mortgage lenders maintain
that they engage in "rigorous background checks, continuous
training, and ongoing performance monitoring"'165 that mortgage
brokerage companies do not.
According to MBA, greater state regulation in the form of
individual-level licensing is also undesirable because it can lead to
regulatory migration. Regulatory migration occurs when mortgage
lenders "restructure under a Federal charter so as to avoid . . . [the]
strict licensing regime [of the states], as the Federal banking agencies
do not require licensure of individual loan officers.'' 166 Ms. Bryce
forecasts that the unfortunate result of regulatory migration will be
that the "mortgage banking entrepreneurial spirit will thus be
somewhat constrained not by the realities of the marketplace, but by
the force of duplicative regulation."'167 Based on these factors,
MBA's position is that "mortgage bankers are different than
mortgage brokers and these differences underscore the need for
mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers to be subject to different
oversight regimes.
'' 68
163. Id. at6.
164. Id. Ms. Bryce also asserts that states have extended individual level licensing to "support staff
working within a licensed mortgage banking company." Id. at 6. This statement is not accurate as state
licensing statutes routinely exclude support and clerical personnel from the definition of "licensee." For
example, North Carolina's Mortgage Lending Act imposes licensure requirements on mortgage lenders
and mortgage brokers. This Act specifically excludes from licensure "[a]ny employee of a licensee
whose responsibilities are limited to clerical and administrative tasks for his or her employer and who
does not solicit borrowers, accept applications, or negotiate the terms of loans on behalf of the
employer." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-243.01(8)(b) (2005).
165. Licensing and Registration Hearing, supra note 11, at 6 (testimony of Teresa Bryce, Mortgage
Bankers Association).
166. Id. at 8.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 7.
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NMBA's and MBA's positions on individual-level versus
institutional-level licensing are naturally determined by self-interest.
Accordingly, their arguments must be examined critically and with
reference to an external norm. For this Article, that norm is effective
consumer protection, and it is applied to the channel bias issue in Part
III.
B. State Regulator Reservations
State regulators have been less openly vocal in their criticisms of
the NMLS than mortgage industry participants. The paucity of
regulator criticism may be due in part to the fact that heads of forty
state agencies have expressed their intention to participate in the
NMLS. 169 Regulators in these states would not be inclined to
impeach that decision. Further, unlike industry participants who act
under an imperative to protect their turf, regulators in uncommitted
states have no such incentive to speak out. In fact, they have an
incentive to say little as their states take a wait-and-see approach. The
minutes of a meeting of the Texas Finance Commission, however,
provide a glimpse into the reservations that state regulators may have
about the NMLS. 170
At a briefing session of the Texas Finance Commission held on
June 8, 2006, one of the agenda items was "Discussion of and
Possible Vote on the National Mortgage Licensing Database Project
of CSBS and AARMR.' 171 The meeting minutes reveal the
discussion began on an affirming note as the Chairman stated that
"with a good understanding of [the NMLS] project and the combined
support of the three [state finance] agencies and the Finance
Commission,'' 72 he anticipated that the "key focus moving forward
[would] be to identify potential legislative initiatives resulting from
participation in the National Mortgage Licensing Database
169. See Project Status, supra note 35.
170. Texas Finance Commission Meeting Minutes, supra note 54.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id.
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project.,' 173 The minutes also confirm that the commissioners
discussed the "advantages of standardized forms and the long term
benefit of participation to state agencies"' 74 and recognized that early
participation in the project would enable the state "to have input to
issues and their remedies prior to implementation."'
175
As the meeting progressed, the minutes reflect a more restrained
tone as concerns and unanswered questions began to emerge. One
area of concern was the quality of the data that would be included in
the database. A commissioner noted that "the quality of the data is
dependent upon the type of data loaded into the database[,] such as
enforcement actions.' 76 Although "[o]ne of the goals of the project
is for state agencies to agree to share all pertinent information needed
to make an informed licensing decision,"' 77 the commissioners
acknowledged that state laws and policies might differ with regard to
the types of information reported to the database. One commissioner
identified the quality of data as "a critical point when deciding
whether to participate or not.'
178
The commissioners also expressed reservations about whether the
NMLS would provide appreciable regulatory benefit to the state. The
Commissioner of the Texas Department of Savings and Mortgage
Lending (SML) stated that while "the greatest [purported] benefit to
this project as proposed is regulator access to enforcement actions
from licensees crossing state lines,"' 79 his department currently
"contacts other state regulators by phone and has experienced no
difficulty in gathering the necessary information to make an informed
decision on a potential licensee."' 80 In his view, "the current database
used by the SML is flexible and meets their current and projected
needs."'181 As a result, "participation in this [NMLS] project would be
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Texas Finance Commission Meeting Minutes, supra note 54, at 2.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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as an enhancement to their current database, not a replacement."', 82
Although this Commissioner said the SML "embraces the overall
objective [of the NMLS] and will remain involved in the CSBS/
AARMR project, [he] does not see a perceived advantage over the
current licensing system that the Department uses today."
'1 83
The commissioners also considered the utility of the NMLS with
regard to the costs of participation versus the prospect of future cost
savings. The discussion acknowledged that participation in the
NMLS might result in additional fees or surcharges to the state, the
amount of which could not be known at this time as the system was
in its initial stages of development and "the business plan is not yet
finalized.' ' 184 Similar uncertainty applied to the realization of future
costs savings, which might be offset to an unknown degree by the
possible need for "additional FTEs"'185 that would be required for
state agencies to implement the NMLS.
Two other concerns, likely intertwined in the minds of the com-
missioners, are (1) the need for legislative authorization to participate
in the NMLS and legislative amendments to bring existing statutes
into conformity with NMLS forms and procedures and (2) the
opposition of state and national mortgage industry trade groups to the
NMLS. Although the legislative changes that would be needed if
Texas were to decide to participate in the NMLS are not specifically
described in the minutes, the commissioners acknowledge that
enabling legislation and conforming amendments will be necessary.186
Concern about the opposition of the mortgage brokerage industry
is a matter more of pragmatism than of theory, but it is not on that
account unimportant. Consent of the one to be regulated is obviously
not a prerequisite for regulation, but opposition that is translated into
effective political action is just as obviously an impediment to
enacting the enabling legislation necessary to authorize participation
182. Texas Finance Commission Meeting Minutes, supra note 54, at 3.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 3.
185. Id. at 4.
186. Id. at 3.
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in the NMLS. In the eyes of one commissioner, "the SML does not
have stakeholder support to participate or to pass the costs on to the
affected industries."' 187 As a result, he "does not realistically see
participation.,
188
Faced with uncertainties about the degree of enhancement of
regulatory effectiveness, the cost of system start-up and maintenance
compared with future administrative savings, and the difficulty of
securing enabling legislation over the opposition of the mortgage
industry, the Texas Department of Finance concluded that it did "not
anticipate any legislative initiatives related to [the NMLS] until the
2009 legislative session"'i 89 and that it would "leave the options open
until further information is gained."'190
Texas remains one of the thirteen states that have not committed to
participate in the NMLS, and the questions posed and concerns
expressed by the Texas Finance Commission are instructive.
III. SIFTING THROUGH THE RHETORIC: ANALYZING THE BENEFITS
AND LIMITATIONS OF THE NMLS
Two related documents provide concise expressions of CSBS/
AARMR's responses to NAMB's and MBA's criticisms of the
NMLS. These are the Statement of Principles and Related Sample
Legislative Language 91 (NMLS Principles) and an accompanying
Media Release. 192 The Media Release clearly states that the purpose
187. Id. at4.
188. Texas Finance Commission Meeting Minutes, supra note 54, at 4.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. CSBS/AARMR Residential Mortgage Licensing System Statement of Principles and Related
Sample Legislative Language (Feb. 2007) http://www.csbs.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Mortgage-Licensing&Template=/CM/ContentDispay.cn&ContentD=- 10055
[hereinafter Statement of Principles and Sample Legislative Language]. CSBS/AARMR prepared the
Statement of Principles in February of 2007 to clarify the distinction between enabling legislation (a
proper concern for CSBS/AARMR) and substantive mortgage regulatory legislation (a matter left to
state determination) and to assist states with the preparation of enabling legislation.
192. Press Release, CSBS, CSBS/AARMR Set Principles for State Legislation on Mortgage
Licensing System (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.csbs.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Mortgage_
Licensing&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.c fm&ContentlD= 10054 [hereinafter CSBS/AARMR
February 20, 2007, Press Release].
20071
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 455 2007-2008
)    I  455 
   
    
t  ries.,,187   
rti i ti . ,,188 
  t  
 ss,    
   
    
t  t 
t     
 sion,,189   
 i ed.,,190 
tt   
t    
   
 :  
     
   
'     
.   t  l  
  191 i  
   
[d. t  
 ra  
[ . 
[ . 
!. I  i ti l t  i i   t    
   .  . . r l / 
ti rt a e _ t / l tent ispl fm&ContentID=   
i t r t t t  i i l   l  i l ti  .     
r r r  f r /A )  s st ti  rt  r l t r  l i l ti  (  tt r l ft t  
 
/AA   
i i  t  . , , tt :// . . r l ITemplate.cfm?Section=Mortgage_ 
plate=/ lHTMLDisplay.cf ontentID=I  t   
 
41
Wilson,: All Things Considered:  The Contribution of the National Mortgage
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
for issuing the NMLS Principles is to "dispel many of the concerns
that have been raised to date about the System."' 93 There is little
doubt that those concerns are the ones raised in NAMB's Position
Statement and MBA's Issue Paper. CSBS/AARMR's responses,
while better reasoned than the mortgage industry's criticisms, none-
theless require a degree of correction and in some instances are aided
by an elaboration on related issues and policies.
A. Insufficient Compliance Burden Relief
The central idea in this criticism is that the NMLS provides
insufficient compliance burden relief because each of the MU Forms
is subject to additional jurisdiction-specific requirements. Both the
existence of that limitation on uniformity and the diversity of the
state-imposed requirements are undeniable. At the same time,
however, three factors limit the influence of this criticism. The first
limitation is that the industry criticizes CSBS/AARMR for failing to
achieve a result that was never a goal of the NMLS-the imposition
of nationwide uniformity with regard to mortgage broker and
mortgage lender licensing laws. CSBS/AARMR has consistently
affirmed the "primacy of states' role in determining how best to
supervise mortgage lending in their state." 194 Furthermore, given the
inherent sovereignty of each state implicit in horizontal federalism,
any project that states might undertake on a collaborative basis must
necessarily recognize each state's power to determine the terms on
which it will participate. It is an unconvincing rhetorical strategy for
NAMB and MBA to accept and even promote state-level regulation
and then criticize CSBS/AARMR for failing to accomplish a goal
that is beyond the states' power.
The second shortcoming of the mortgage industry's criticism is
that it creates a false binary choice between maximal compliance
burden relief and no relief at all and disregards the gains in
uniformity the MU Forms do produce. Even though licensees may be
193. Id.
194. Id.
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faced with some jurisdiction-specific requirements, the number of
those requirements is small in comparison with the number of
requirements held in common by states that adopt the MU Forms.
Furthermore, even though thirteen states have not yet committed to
participating in the NMLS, forty state agencies in thirty-seven states
plus the District of Columbia have committed.' 95 That level of
participation should produce a meaningful net gain in compliance
burden relief for mortgage industry licensees.
The third deficiency of the inadequate compliance burden relief
criticism is that it fails to consider future developments in the NMLS,
both with regard to the evolution of the MU Forms and to additional
components planned for the System. The NMLS can be expected to
evolve as more states participate. As critical mass is attained, even
more states will be attracted, and increased participation can be
expected to produce a leveling effect on state regulatory regimes.
Jurisdiction-specific requirements that are perceived as productive
can become incorporated into the MU Forms, while states that
impose non-uniform requirements will likely be motivated to
consider whether those requirements are worth the administrative
costs that result from deviating from the standardized forms and
procedures of the NMLS. Furthermore, the NMLS eases the
compliance burden by identifying the relevant jurisdiction-specific
requirements. Locating these requirements must be seen as a major
benefit for licensees. Finally, CSBS/AARMR will be motivated to
reconsider requirements in the MU Forms that are perceived as
driving states to adopt non-uniform provisions and to determine
whether those requirements are worth the disharmony they produce.
In addition to the expected evolution of existing components of the
NMLS, there are also uniformity-encouraging components that have
been planned but have not yet been implemented. For example,
CSBS/AARMR is working to "develop[] standard statutory and
regulatory policies that would be endorsed for use in all participating
195. See Project Status, supra note 35.
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states."' 96 The first phase of this project, which is proceeding parallel
with the development of the NMLS, involves the cooperative efforts
of twenty-three state regulatory agencies to develop standardized
education and testing requirements for mortgage professionals. 197 The
Mortgage Industry National Uniform Testing and Educations
Standards (MINUTES) initiative seeks to establish "uniform
standards and streamline the process for licensees to comply with
[education and testing] standards" so that "licensed mortgage
providers are held to the same standards and expectations, regardless
of the state in which they make loans."' 9 8 Once again, as critical mass
builds, a consensus of opinion among state regulators should emerge
with regard to education and testing standards. There is no guarantee
that this consensus will effect a complete leveling of inter-state
differences, but growing consensus will translate into some measure
-and potentially a large measure-of the uniformity and compliance
burden relief that licensees seek.
B. Overly Burdensome Disclosure Requirements
The essence of this criticism of the NMLS is that the disclosure
requirements of the MU Forms exceed the requirements imposed by
some states. Even if this criticism is accurate for a subset of states, it
is important to note that it is founded on an unstated premise-states
with few disclosure requirements should be normative and the level
of disclosure the NMLS should seek is that of the lowest common
denominator. In other words, when it comes to the development of a
regulatory regime, the residential mortgage industry would like to see
a race to the bottom.
CSBS/AARMR's decision to seek a greater degree of disclosure
through the MU Forms than some states currently require also arises
from a premise, which is that by promoting more rather than less
196. CSBS/AARMR February 20,2007, Press Release, supra note 192.
197. Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 10 (testimony of Steven L.
Antonakes).
198. Id.
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disclosure, the MU Forms encourage states to participate in a
regulatory race to the top. CSBS/AARMR displays this goal when it
states that one purpose of the MU Forms is to "improve consistency
across states as to the type and quality of information being provided
to regulators by mortgage lenders and brokers . . . ,199 The MU
Forms do not seek uniformity alone; as indicated by the reference to
quality, they seek uniformity at an elevated level. This goal is always
subject to the primacy of state self-determination, but to the extent
that increased participation creates a critical mass, consensus about
the appropriate level of disclosures on the MU Forms should emerge
in much the same manner as with other matters of uniformity. Again,
NAMB and MBA tend to view the disclosure requirements of the
NMLS in static terms and to ignore the process elements involved in
development and implementation of the system, including their own
input into that process.
C. Privacy, Accuracy, and Responsibility for Security Breaches
Mortgage industry criticisms of the NMLS concerning privacy and
responsibility for security breaches focus on the transmission of
personal information about licensees outside the control of state
governmental agencies and into the possession of "a third-party
vendor, with no relationship to the real estate finance industry."
200
Mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers complain that by involving
this third party the NMLS increases the risk of security breaches but
fails to provide a way to hold anyone accountable. Rather than
automatically equating a transfer of responsibility for management of
information with a likelihood of security breaches, a more cogent
formulation of the mortgage industry's concern would be to ask
whether the NMLS provides controls on access to information and
whether it provides remedies for mishandling of information that are
comparable to those controls and remedies currently in place in
199. Kentucky News Release, supra note 45, at 30.
200. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
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participating states. When viewed from this perspective, the
industry's objections appear more illusory than real.
One basis for this conclusion is that the industry fails to
acknowledge that "[l]icense information contained in the
CSBS/AARMR Residential Mortgage Licensing System will be
owned by the state agency through which it was submitted and will
be subject to that particular state's privacy laws." 20' The NMLS
thereby preserves the access controls and remedies that currently
protect licensees. To further reinforce the protections afforded to
information collected by the NMLS, CSBS/AARMR has drafted
proposed legislation for participating states that provides, "No person
shall be authorized to obtain information from the multi-state data-
base or initiate any action based on information obtained from the
multi-state database that they could not otherwise have obtained or
initiated based on information currently available to them under
existing state law. 2 °2
Furthermore, in the event a security breach does occur, licensees
are not left without recourse, as the NMLS "will implement and
maintain written data security and breach notification policies" that
will be "consistent with current requirements for state third-party
contractors. ' ' 203 To ensure transparency of those policies and to
demonstrate full compliance with state law, CSBS/AARMR will
provide a copy of the contract between the SRR and the applicable
regulatory agency of each state. In short, current levels of privacy
protection and of accountability for security breaches are unchanged
by the NMLS database. What was protected by state law before
submission to the database remains protected in the same way by the
same law after submission.
The mortgage industry's objection that the database will contain
inaccurate and uncorrectable information seeks to create controversy
by improperly characterizing the type of information the NMLS will
make available to the public. CSBS/AARMR has clearly stated that
201. Statement of Principles and Sample Legislative Language, supra note 191, at 1.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2.
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the database will serve as a repository of only "publicly adjudicated
enforcement actions." 204 Thus, before any information is incorporated
into the database, a licensee will already have had the opportunity to
challenge any charges he or she believes are unfounded via state
administrative and judicial appeal procedures. The idea that the
NMLS receives any complaints directly from consumers or has any
adjudicatory authority is simply wrong. Because the NMLS database
will contain only information obtained from state regulators, it does
not alter the complaint filing and resolution procedures, including
appeals, that are part of participating states' laws.
It is true that some parts of the NW Forms require a licensee to
disclose matters that are less than fully adjudicated, including charges
of a misdemeanor offense involving financial wrongdoing and
consumer complaints that were settled "for any amount."20 5 The
former could potentially include unsubstantiated claims, and the latter
could include unproven claims that were settled for nuisance value
rather than on the basis of merit. Such scenarios, in a licensee's eyes,
could result in an inaccurate picture of a licensee's behavior and
thereby support the industry's call for procedures that would allow a
licensee to challenge adverse information. The problem with this
position, however, is that it fails to take into account the fact that
different categories of database users will have different levels of
access to information, especially to fully-adjudicated as opposed to
less-than-fully adjudicated claims. The former, which do not present
accuracy problems precisely because they have been publicly
adjudicated, will be made available to the public via the NMLS
database. The latter do not present the problem the mortgage industry
describes because information that has not been fully and publicly
adjudicated is restricted to state regulators. The mortgage industry
204. CSBS October 4, 2006, Press Release, supra note 7. Indeed, from the consumer's standpoint, the
NMLS database is deficient for precisely the opposite reason-it does not make enough information
available. By failing to include any information about financial service related claims that were filed
against lenders and brokers but were settled and dismissed prior to final adjudication, the database
denies consumers information that is clearly relevant to their decision concerning whom to hire or to
avoid.
205. See supra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
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does not acknowledge this critical distinction between groups and the
information to which each will have access.
Making some types of less-than-fully-adjudicated information
available to state regulators can be justified on three grounds. First,
the scope of such information is restricted. The disclosure
requirement involves only charges relating to specified activities:
misdemeanors "involving financial services or a financial services-
related business; any fraud, false statements, or omissions; any theft
or wrongful taking of property; bribery; perjury; forgery; counter-
feiting; extortion; or a conspiracy to commit any of these
offenses. ' 2°6 Beyond these activities are a wide range of other
behaviors that need not be revealed and will remain private as far as
the NMLS is concerned.
Second, the charges that must be disclosed are directly relevant to
a person's application for licensure as a mortgage broker or mortgage
lender. The very nature of the lending process calls for heightened
levels of honesty, as (1) mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers
receive, hold, and distribute a consumer's money; (2) lenders and
brokers act in concert with each other and with third parties in
matters that directly impact the availability and cost of credit for
consumers: and (3) lenders and brokers have extensive knowledge of
the mortgage lending process not shared by the vast majority of
consumers, which necessarily leads to consumer reliance on lender
and broker honesty with regard to the largest and most complicated
financial transaction most people ever experience.
Third, as part of the license application or renewal process, an
applicant will have the opportunity to provide exculpatory
information to explain why the charges were disputed and did not
lead to final adjudication or why a charge was settled despite lack of
merit. In such a context, the interest of protecting consumers
outweighs lenders' and brokers' objections to the limited and
206. Form MUI, supra note 19, at question 8(3)(1) (emphasis deleted); see Form MU2, supra note
19, at question 8(G)(2); Form MU4, supra note 19, at question 9(G)(2).
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controlled disclosure of some less-than-finally adjudicated
information.
D. Expense & Anticipated Savings
This criticism of the NMLS is initially problematic because it is
counterintuitive to assert that a centralized licensing system
employing modem technology and eliminating redundant activities
will not produce some degree of cost savings. Even with the retention
of some jurisdiction-specific requirements, the bulk of the application
process is unified by the MU Forms, which should produce
efficiencies and savings for both licensees and regulators. On the
other hand, it is indisputable that there will be expenses associated
with NMLS. The participating states will pick up the cost of
developing the system; operating costs will be covered by fees paid
by licensees.
Because the NMLS is not yet fully operational, the exact amount
of operating costs, of fees to be assessed, and of savings to be
realized cannot be known precisely. In the absence of that
information, the fairness of the fees to be shouldered by the industry
can be evaluated only with reference to the procedures that will be
employed to calculate them. In this regard, CSBS/AARMR has
announced three relevant policies. The first policy is that the
"processing fees charged by the [SRR] for operating and updating the
[NMLS] will be determined by SRR Board of Managers, with input
from the Mortgage Advisory Council. 2 °7 Because the Mortgage
Advisory Council (MAC) includes mortgage brokers and mortgage
lenders, industry representatives will have a say in the fee
structure. 208 "Having a say" will admittedly be cold comfort if the
SRR Board of Managers can ignore the brokers' and lenders'
opinions with impunity. However, if the Board of Managers acts
unreasonably, industry representatives will surely complain
vigorously and publicly. If the complaints are both reasonable and
207. Statement of Principles and Sample Legislative Language, supra note 191, at 2.
208. Id.
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ignored, the credibility of the NMLS will be compromised.
CSBS/AARMR has a vested interest in maintaining the integrity of
the NMLS, as it will be difficult for a tarnished system to achieve or
maintain the critical mass of state participation that CSBS/AARMR
seeks and upon which the success of the NMLS to a large measure
depends.
The second policy involves fee uniformity, which CSBS/AARMR
will maintain through its rule that "[p]articipating states will not be
able to negotiate an individual fee structure." 20 9 Thus, licensees in
different states will not be subjected to different fees because of the
negotiating power of any state. The third policy involves the
transparency of SRR operations. CSBS/AARMR has pledged to
make "[a]udited financial statements of the SRR . . . available to
system users, state [agencies,] and licensees." 210 Opportunity for
input, consistent application, and transparent procedures all mitigate
industry concerns about System fees.
E. Inadequate Industry Input
The criticism of inadequate industry input into the development of
the NMLS must be evaluated carefully to determine whether the
industry is complaining that its suggestions and concerns were
excluded from consideration or were considered but not adopted. As
a historical matter, it appears that the mortgage lending industry has
had the opportunity to participate and has contributed. Press releases
and representatives' statements from CSBS/AARMR, MBA, and
NAMB each refer to industry involvement in the development of the
NMLS.211 CSBS/AARMR states that it began working on the MU
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. CSBS October 4, 2006, Press Release, supra note 7 (citing twenty-one month effort involving
"CSBS, [AARMR], and the industry to develop an online licensing system using uniform mortgage
license applications"); MBA NewsLink, supra note 105, (citing CSBS's invitation to "mortgage lenders'
licensing and compliance staff... to critically evaluate CSBS's proposal"); NAMB Position Statement,
supra note 63 (citing NAMB's participation in a "CSBS/AARMR-formed industry working group"
since at least summer of 2006 and noting that NAMB has been able to express its concerns about the
NMLS "throughout discussions with CSBS/AARMR and the industry working group").
[Vol. 24:415
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 464 2007-2008
464  IT    .  
  . 
   
   
  i  I  
    
 
   I  
   rticipating  
t  ture.,,209   
  t  t    
     
r c    . I    
 t  .  
,  ees.,,210 it   
i t, i t t li ti ,  r t   
  t   
. uate   
 i   t   t  
t      ll  i    
i      
l   i ti       
 i t i l ,       
 t  rt it  t  ti i t     s 
 tatives' ts I   
  r f r t  i tr  i l t i  t  l t   
.2I1 /    
. 
. . 
.  t r , , r ss l ,  t   iti  t t  t    
, [ ],  t  i tr  t  l   li  li i  t  nn  
lice se a licati s");  s i , s r  t  , ( iti  '  i it ti  t  t e l rs' 
li si   li  st ff ... t  riti ll  l t  '  l");  iti  , 
supra te 63 (citi  's rti i ti  i   / R-fonned i tr  i   
si ce t l st s r f   ti  t t    l  t   it   t t  
 t t i i s     
50
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss2/8
THE NMLS AND PREDATORY LENDING
Forms in January of 2005 and that the mortgage industry involvement
began only two months later.212 It also appears that industry input has
been influential as CSBS/AARMR says it made "26 out of 40
industry-requested changes . . . to paper forms" and will make an
"[a]dditional 10 changes to [the] online system."213 Industry
representatives do not seem to dispute these claims. The requested
changes that were denied likely relate to conceptual issues, such as
the scope of disclosures and treatment of mortgage brokers vis-A-vis
mortgage bankers, that are either simply inherent in the conflicting
nature of the constituents' outlooks and interests or are beyond the
ability of CSBS/AARMR to resolve because of the constraints of
horizontal and vertical federalism.
Furthermore, charges of industry exclusion seem inconsistent with
industry plans for future participation. All three groups--CSBS/
AARMR, MBA, and NAMB (threatening tone of its Position
Statement notwithstanding)-anticipate continued industry involve-
ment as the NMLS is refined, implemented, and expanded. For
example, CSBS/AARMR and the Mortgage Advisory Council plan to
"meet regularly," and representatives of the mortgage lending and
brokering industry will "be briefed on all major actions under
consideration by the SRR." '214 NAMB's and MBA's allegations of
exclusion are belied by their commitment to ongoing collaboration
with CSBS/AARMR.
Although industry input obviously should not dictate policy
decisions by state regulators as they develop the NMLS, especially
where industry positions run counter to a state's regulatory and
consumer protection responsibilities, the presence or absence of
industry involvement can have pragmatic repercussions. Such
repercussions are perhaps most obvious in the political process
necessary for a state to enact enabling legislation authorizing
participation in the NMLS. The comments of Texas Finance
Commission members and staff to the effect that the Department of
212. AFSA STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FORUM, supra note 34, at 14.
213. Id.
214. Statement of Principles and Sample Legislative Language, supra note 191, at 2.
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Savings and Mortgage Lending "does not have stakeholder support to
participate ' '215 in the NMLS vividly illustrates this point. The matter
thus becomes one of CSBS/AARMR engaging in meaningful
dialogue with NAMB, MBA, and other industry representatives while
at the same time remaining faithful to the regulatory and consumer
protection goals of the NMLS.
On the other hand, while industry opposition to the NMLS should
not be discounted neither should it be overestimated. For example, in
a press release announcing Idaho's decision to participate in the
NMLS, the Director of the Idaho Department of Finance is quoted as
saying that enabling legislation was enacted in that state "[w]ith
support from the Idaho Association of Mortgage Brokers and the
Idaho Mortgage Lender's Association." 216 The credibility of this
comment is bolstered by the fact that both of these trade associations
participated in that press release. Given the call in NAMB's Position
Statement for state chapters to oppose any enabling legislation that
promotes regulation inconsistent with NAMB's demands, it is likely
that mortgage industry support for such legislation in Idaho confirms
the other side of the pragmatism coin-in an environment where the
damage done by predatory lending is increasingly part of the public
consciousness, mortgage industry participation in initiatives like the
NMLS is a political necessity.
As for MBA's demands concerning the NMLS, they simply go too
far and reflect only one component of a full public policy debate.
MBA is correct to observe that the residential mortgage market has
changed dramatically over the past two decades, and while market
evolution cannot be ignored neither can that evolution be treated as if
it were the only matter for policymakers to consider. While the
capital that funds residential mortgage lending may come from
national and even international sources, the consequences of
215. Texas Finance Commission Meeting Minutes, supra note 54, at 4.
216. Press Release, Idaho Dep't of Fin., Idaho Department of Finance Announces Commitment To
Participate In CSBS/AARMR Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://finance.idaho.gov/PR/2007/ CSBSMortgageProj2-07_Final.pdf.
[Vol. 24-'415
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 466 2007-2008
466  I IT    l. ~ S 
  e  s  l er   
i ipate,,215  l  t s   
     
 , ,   t ti es  
  i     r 
 . 
       l  
     
  i      
        
  ti      l t  
      
   ciation.,,216     
t      ti s 
t     's  
t rs      
 i  t '   l  
      
 tis  i  t  
     i ly t  i  
,   i    
 l  
 i g    
  l t l   t     . 
  t        
 ll      t 
ti          
    ers   
t l l      
l   l , ces f 
.  i  i i  ti  i t ,  t  , t . 
. r ss l s , I  't f i ., I  rt t f i  s it t  
ti i t  I  /  ti i  t  i i  t  . , , 
.i aho.govlPR/2 07/  _ MortgageProj2-07 _ Final.pdf. 
52
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss2/8
THE NMLS AND PREDATORY LENDING
predatory lending are felt locally.217 It is people and families who
suffer when mortgage lenders and brokers engage in predatory
lending.218 It is neighborhoods that suffer when predatory practices
lead to foreclosed homes, which in turn devalue nearby properties
and frustrate neighborhood revitalization projects.2 19 It is towns and
cities that suffer when foreclosed homes decrease tax revenues while
simultaneously compelling increased expenditures for public
safety,220 social assistance, and foreclosure rescue programs.2 2 ' As
217. The effect of loan defaults on the sources of capital is uncertain due to the fragmentation of the
securitization process. In response to Federal Reserve Board Governor Mark W. Olson's question about
why there is not a "day of reckoning" for poorly underwritten subprime loans, one panelist replied that
high subprime loan pricing allows profits to be earned in the aggregate even if there are losses on
individual loans and that the disintegration of the loan process has diluted the accountabilities that once
were built into the market. FRB Sustainable Homeownership Forum, June 9, 2006, supra note 59, at
111-13 (comments of Irv Ackelsberg, Managing Attorney, Community Legal Services of Philadelphia,
and Emeritus Professor of Finance at the Wharton School of Economics, University of Pennsylvania). A
reckoning now appears to be occurring as some subprime lenders have recently been forced out of
business. For a list of defunct mortgage firms and units, see National Mortgage News Online, Casualty
Lists, http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/subprime/defunct (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
Unfortunately, the reckoning has not been limited to predatory lenders and brokers or to greedy
securitizers and investors. Also caught up are homeowners, neighborhoods, and cities.
218. There are numerous reports that document the repercussions of foreclosure and of the
unoccupied homes that too often accompany foreclosure. See, e.g., IRA GOLDSTEIN, LOST VALUES: A
STUDY OF PREDATORY LENDING IN PHILADELPHIA (2007), http://www.trfund.com/
resource/downloads/staffwritings/LostValues_may2007.pdf; ELLEN SCHLOEMER, WEI LI, KEITH ERNST
& KATHLEEN KEEST, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE
SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS (2006), http://www.responsiblelending.
org/pdfs/Fclosure-exec-summary-standalone.pdf; Wilson, supra note 5, at 1481-84.
219. See FRB Forum, Building Sustainable Homeownership at 4 (June 7, 2006),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/publichearings/hoepa/2006/20060607/026toO5 0 .htm (prepared
comments of Geoff Smith, Project Director, Woodstock Institute) (citing Woodstock Institute research
showing that "foreclosures have a significant impact on local economic development" as "[e]ach
foreclosure within a city block of a property decreases the value of that property by as much as 1.4
percent per foreclosure in lower-income communities." The rise in the rate of foreclosures has
"result[ed] in cumulative lost property values in the hundreds of millions of dollars each year"). These
costs are "in addition to the costs to city governments related to maintaining derelict properties, fire
prevention, crime." Id. The potential for holding creditors liable for the externalities of predatory
lending is addressed in Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REv. 355 (2006).
220. Studies have been conducted to determine whether there is any link between foreclosures and
crime. One study concludes that increased incidence of foreclosure in a neighborhood is associated with
increased rates of violent crime. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure:
The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 4 HOUSING STUD. 6
(2006). Another study concludes that an increase in mortgage lending in a neighborhood is associated
with reduced levels of crime. CHARIS E. KUBRIN & GREGORY D. SQUIRES, THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL ON
CRIME: DOES ACCESS TO HOME MORTGAGE MONEY REDUCE CRIME RATES?,
http://realcostofprisons.org/materials/_Tpapr3.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
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North Carolina Commissioner of Banks and CSBS Director Joseph
A. Smith, Jr. said in congressional testimony, "Residential mortgage
lending is a local activity, but changes in technology and deregulation
make financing these loans a global industry. The damage done by
predatory lending and mortgage fraud, however, is still local. 222
The clamor of the mortgage lending industry for a regulatory
regime that promotes business efficiencies elevates what is a relevant
interest to the status of the determinative interest. Business efficiency
has importance for policymaking only to the extent it could be shown
that regulation would result in an increase in the cost of constructive
credit or in a decrease in the availability of constructive credit and
that such increase in cost or decrease in availability exceeds the
benefits of increased consumer protection.22 3 When mortgage lenders
and brokers discuss the cost and availability of credit, they omit the
comparative component.
221. The economic harm to localities is further established by the measures state governments feel
compelled to take to mitigate the impact of foreclosures. For example, a growing number of states are
establishing foreclosure relief programs to help residents who face default on high-cost loans. Such
programs exist in Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Ohio. For example, the Ohio Housing Finance
Agency (OHFA) began a program in April of 2007, the Opportunity Loan Refinance Program (OLRP),
to offer thirty-year fixed-rate loans to homeowners who face payment shock as a result of the resetting
of interest rates on adjustable rate mortgages, a problem that is especially serious with 2/28 and other
forms of "exploding" ARMs. The OLRP is being financed through taxable bonds. Terms of the program
are available at Opportunity Loan Refinance Program, http://www.ohiohome.org/refinance/default.htm
(last visited Nov. 4, 2007). In addition, OHFA is spending $3.1 million to fund a foreclosure rescue
program for families experiencing temporary financial problems. A description of this program is
available in a press release from the Ohio Housing Finance Agency, Ohio Housing Finance Board
Approves Foreclosure Prevention Program (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.ohiohome.org/
newsreleases/rlsboardapr07.htm.
222. Licensing and Registration Hearing, supra note 11, at 2 (testimony of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., of
CSBS).
223. It has long been a mantra of the mortgage lending industry that regulation will increase the cost
of credit or result in credit rationing. See, e.g., GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, MICHAEL E. STATEN &
JEVGENUS STEINBUKS, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., MCDONOUGH SCH. OF BUS., GEORGETOWN UNIV., THE
EFFECTS OF STATE PREDATORY LENDING LAWS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
CREDIT (2006), http://www.gwu.edu/-business/research/centers/fsrp/pdf/M38.pdf Other studies have
reached a contrary conclusion, including ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA-
CHAPEL HILL, THE IMPACT OF NORTH CAROLINA'S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A DESCRIPTIVE
ASSESSMENT 22 (2003), http://www.planning.unc.edu/pdf/CCNCAnti Predatory- Law lmpact.pdf;
WEI LI & KEITH S. ERNST, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE BEST VALUE IN THE SUBPRIME
MARKET STATE PREDATORY LENDING REFORMS 15 (2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/
pdfs/rrO 10-StateEffects-0206.pdf.
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Two points should be emphasized here. The first concerns the
phrase "constructive credit." Residential mortgage industry
representatives avoid using any similar adjective in the oft-repeated
claim that the deregulation of financial services has created an
"innovative and dynamic industry," which has made credit available
"to more socio and economic classes than ever before in the history
of our consumer credit system., 224 Residential mortgage lenders and
brokers treat credit availability as axiomatically good and fail to
acknowledge the destructive potential of credit that is predatory.
Constructive credit is credit that is free of abusive terms, is suited to a
consumer's financial situation, and is marketed in a manner that does
not seek to exploit the asymmetries of information and power that
exist between the lender or broker and the consumer. Credit that has
opposing characteristics and that sets the consumer up for failure is
destructive credit. The reality of destructive credit is captured in
evocative-but unfortunately all-too-accurate-phrases such as
"toxic mortgage" and "exploding" ARMs. As Iowa Attorney General
Tom Miller observed in a Senate Committee hearing in 2001,
"Drying up productive credit would be of grave concern; drying up
destructive debt is sound economic and public policy. ' 225 With regard
to the regulation of mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers, good
social policy requires that a state not sacrifice its interest in protecting
its citizens and its economy simply to promote the business interests
of multi-state licensees.
The second point involves the comparative component. The "cost"
of credit, for policymaking purposes, involves more than just the
points, fees, and interest rate that lenders and brokers emphasize.
These items may measure the price of credit charged by a lender, but
cost is patently a broader concept than that. "Cost" should also
include all adverse impacts that a predatory loan extracts or imposes,
such as the wealth consumers lose to equity stripping and to higher
224. FRB Sustainable Homeownership Forum, July 11, 2006, supra note 52, at 33 (comments of
Harry H. Dinham of NAMB).
225. Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 54 (2001) (testimony of Thomas Miller).
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interest rates they will pay in the future because foreclosure has
lowered their credit score. Additionally, "cost" should include the
externalities that predatory lending imposes on neighborhoods, cities,
and states. When mortgage lending industry representatives claim
that regulation is undesirable, policymakers must remember to ask,
"Compared to what?"
Finally, even though MBA purports to condition its support of the
NMLS on compliance with its reform agenda, the organization
anticipates ongoing collaboration with CSBS/AARMR and publicly
announced its support for the Statement of Principles and Related
226Sample Legislative Language. Like NAMB, MBA's stated
conditions for continued participation in the development of the
NMLS give way to the realization that it is better to be perceived as
part of the solution to predatory lending than as the source of the
problem.
F. Channel Bias
This criticism of the NMLS takes two different forms depending
on whether it comes from the MBA or the NAMB. For the MBA, the
NMLS expresses channel bias against its members and in favor of
mortgage brokers because it is receptive to licensing at the individual
loan originator level rather than limiting licensure to the institutional
level. The NAMB criticizes the NMLS for the opposite reason, which
is that the NMLS only permits and does not require individual level
licensing for loan officers employed by mortgage lenders. NAMB
expands this dispute to include all mortgage originators, by which it
means "all federal and state-regulated banks and their subsidiaries,
along with credit unions, mortgage bankers, lenders, brokers, and all
employees of these entities. 227 For the NAMB, a regulatory regime
226. Press Release, MBA (Feb. 20, 2007) (stating that MBA "applaud[s] CSBS and AARMR for
agreeing to create a Mortgage Advisory Council that will allow lenders to play a role in making the
RMLS [sic] as effective and efficient as possible"). The RMLS-Residential Mortgage Licensing
System-is another name for the NMLS that CSBS/AARMR used in the early days of the System.
227. NAMB Position Statement, supra note 63.
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that exempts any loan originator from the individual level licensing to
which mortgage brokers are subject displays channel bias.
Both of these criticisms about the NMLS' non-determination of the
appropriate level of licensure are improper, albeit for different
reasons. As noted with regard to the allowance of jurisdiction-
specific requirements in the MU Forms, the guiding principle for
CSBS/AARMR is "the primacy of states' role in determining how
best to supervise mortgage lending in their state." 228 This principle
applies equally to the level of licensure issue as CSBS/AARMR
affirms that the NMLS "does not supersede state law in determining
who needs to be licensed or registered in the System. The decision as
to who is or is not licensed is a state decision. ' 229 Contrary to MBA's
wishes, state sovereignty and horizontal federalism leave
CSBS/AARMR with no option other than to recognize a state's
prerogative to choose individual-level licensing for lenders as well as
brokers.
NAMB's criticism is illegitimate on a different ground. As much as
state regulators would like to protect consumers by having state-level
laws apply to all of the entities NAMB identifies, 230 the aggressive
assertion of federal preemption by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union
Association makes that outcome impossible. 231 Because of the
228. CSBS/AARMR Februrary 20, 2007, Press Release, supra note 192.
229. Id.
230. See Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 249-50 (testimony of Steven L.
Antonakes of CSBS). Mr. Antonakes states that state regulators:
are frustrated in our efforts to protect consumers by the preemption of state consumer
protection laws by federal statutes and federal regulatory agencies. The decision was
made to preempt state laws in favor of developing laws that offer advantages to the
financial services industry. Federal policies and procedures should support, not hinder the
role of state supervisors. State legislatures have the right to expect the laws they passed to
be followed by companies operating in their state. Preemption must be used for the
benefit of both business and consumers. All too often, it seems, preemption benefits tip
the scales too far in favor of businesses, leaving consumers at a disadvantage.
Id. at 249.
231. "The OCC and OTS have tried to make it crystal clear through their regulations that any state
law that conditions what their federally-chartered institutions, subsidiaries of those institutions, or even
20071
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 471 2007-2008
] m    I  471 
 
 l  
'    
  
 
t    
I    s'  
   te.,,228  
/  
 i  
  t   li       
  ,,229  's 
i , t t  i t   i t l   
/  's 
ti  l l l   
 
'     
  
  230  
i  r    
l , t  i      
i    , l   
 ?3l    
. /A R  ,2 ,  ,   . 
. d. 
.   i   tory i  ing, ra  
  
r  t t  i   t  t  t t   t  r 
   
 t  t t t  l  i    l     
i i l i  i t . l    
  
 f ll   i  ti  i   .    
fit f t  i   r . ll t  t , it , ti  it  ti  
t  l  t  f r i  f r  i , l i     . 
.  
.    o      
la  t at iti s t t ir f r ll - rt r  i stit ti s, s si i ri s  t  i tit ti ,   
57
Wilson,: All Things Considered:  The Contribution of the National Mortgage
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
constraints of vertical federalism, CSBS/AARMR can only devise
regulations for lenders and brokers within state jurisdiction. It is
illegitimate for NAMB to criticize the NMLS for failing to achieve a
legally impermissible result. Further, if NAMB were truly insistent
on uniform regulation of all loan originators, it would seem logical
for the group to advocate for federal regulation, which would of
course not be hindered by preemption issues. To the contrary, NAMB
promotes a Model State Statute Initiative (MSSI) for state-level
licensing and regulation of mortgage brokers.232 In the MSSI, NAMB
clearly states that it "[seeks] to have individual state statutes enacted
that require pre-licensure education and mandate continuing
education requirements for all residential loan originators. '233 This
state-level emphasis must be deemed to include an awareness of the
federalism principles that both empower and limit state action.
CONCLUSION
The CSBS/AARMR National Mortgage Licensing System makes
an important contribution to the battle against predatory lending and
should be supported for at least four reasons. First, the NMLS is an
example of thoughtful public policymaking. Although CSBS/
AARMR unmistakably seeks to increase consumer protection with
regard to residential mortgage lending, it also acknowledges the
important contributions of the lending industry.23 4 The NMLS is
special in that it approaches the creation of a regulatory regime from
a dialectic perspective that holds the interests of the principal
agents of those institutions can do are preempted and the states have no ability to enforce state laws
against those institutions." Id. at 249-50.
232. The MSSI is attached as Appendix A to the testimony of Joseph L. Falk of NAMB, Licensing
and Registration Hearing, supra note 11 (testimony of Joseph L. Falk).
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. For example, Steven L. Antonakes, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks, acknowledges both
that the "current disarray in the residential mortgage market" has fostered "an environment of
negligence in lending practices" and that "the mortgage revolution has brought with it a number of good
things: a vast flow of liquidity into the mortgage market, increased availability of mortgage credit, and
higher rates of homeownership." Subprime and Predatory Lending Hearing, supra note 4, at 246, 248
(testimony of Steven L. Antonakes of CSBS).
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constituencies in creative tension as it seeks to find a socially
acceptable balance in the "trade-off between increasing the
availability of credit in the mortgage market and the level of
foreclosures. ' '235 As a result, while all aspects of the NMLS may not
entirely please anyone, it has been able to keep competing
constituencies engaged and productive. By involving the mortgage
industry in the development of the NMLS, CSBS/AARMR fosters a
sense of transparency and fairness, which are important factors in
securing acceptance of the System.
Second, the NMLS is dynamic and thus able to influence and to be
influenced. This characteristic is seen in the tension between the
variability of diverse jurisdiction-specific requirements and the
uniformity inherent in the consistency needed to create critical mass.
As the critical mass of the NMLS grows, it will reflect a consensus
about the content and procedures of a reasonable regulatory
framework, which will in turn promote further uniformity. At the
same time, however, the jurisdiction-specific requirements promote
creativity.
A third reason to support the NMLS is that it demonstrates and
takes advantage of the institutional advantages that states have over
the federal government. One of these advantages is the ability to act
expeditiously. Despite the introduction of numerous anti-predatory
lending bills in Congress in recent years, almost none has made it out
of committee, let alone been enacted into law. By contrast, thirty-six
states and the District of Columbia have enacted predatory lending
statutes since 1999,236 and in only approximately three years,
CSBS/AARMR has been able to take the NMLS from concept to
commitment by forty state regulators. Another institutional advantage
235. Id. at 259.
236. For a list of states that have enacted anti-predatory lending statutes, see Subprime and Predatory
Lending Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit B (testimony of Steven L. Antonakes of CSBS). This exhibit
also includes specific statutory citations and compares the statutes with regard to selected provisions. Id.
A similar document is the Center for Responsible Lending's "State Legislative Scorecard." State
Legislative Scoreboard (Dec. 31, 2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/
statelaws.html. For a critical analysis of state anti-predatory lending statutes see Li & ERNST, supra note
223.
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that states enjoy is the responsiveness to local issues that follows
from proximity with and accountability to local electorate. This
responsiveness leads to experimentation and confirms the role of
states as "laboratories of change." 237 Because the NMLS involves the
collaborative cooperation of the states, it provides a vehicle for
disseminating the outcomes of those experiments.
Finally, the NMLS is valuable because it establishes a standard by
which future proposals for federal regulation can be judged. Any
proposal introduced in Congress that creates preemptive-but less
effective-federal regulation of mortgage brokers and state chartered
lenders will be perceived as protecting the interests of the mortgage
industry and as abandoning consumers. On the other hand, any
federal proposal that does not preempt state regulation but contains
less effective regulatory measures will be superfluous or, even worse,
counterproductive as it would introduce a meaningless additional
layer of regulation.
238
The NMLS addresses a pressing problem, predatory practices in
the residential mortgage market. The NMLS seeks to ameliorate that
problem by doing what is possible given the competing interests of
the relevant parties and the structural constraints of horizontal
federalism and vertical federalism. The NMLS can make a positive
contribution in its current form and has the potential, as it evolves
beyond application forms and a database to include other initiatives,
to accomplish even more. To paraphrase an old saying,239 by
beginning with what is necessary and then doing what is possible, the
NMLS just might end up doing what is thought unachievable-help
237. Justice Julius Brandies wrote in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." This quote can be found in Baher Azmy, Squaring
the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295, 392-93 (2005), which contains an extended
discussion of the value of state experimentation with regard to predatory lending regulation.
238. Non-preemptive federal regulation would not be superfluous or counterproductive for those
states that do not participate in the NMLS. However, that number is currently a minority and is expected
to get even smaller in the future.
239. The saying, of unknown specific date but attributed to St. Francis of Assisi, is "Start doing
what's necessary; then do what's possible; and suddenly you are doing the impossible."
[Vol. 24:415
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reduce predatory practices by mortgage lenders and mortgage
brokers.
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